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I. INTRODUCTION

Recently the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") was
strafed 1 by the congressional leadership and the airline industry,
both sharply criticizing it for requiring an airline to capitalize its
costs of cyclical major inspections and complete overhauls of
aircraft engines. 2 As a result of Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) safety mandates, the airline incurred maintenance costs of
$90,000 to $122,000 for each of its aircraft engines approximately
every four years. 3 With these inspections and proper routine
maintenance, such aircraft engines have estimated average
aggregate service lives of more than twenty-two years. 4 The Service
issued a Technical Advice Memorandum (T.A.M.) requiring the
capitalization of the costs under the rationale that the expenditures
produced substantial improvements by increasing the values and

According to Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, "strafe", meaning to rake
ground troops with machine gun fire from low-flying aircraft, comes from Gott strafe England
(God punish England), a World War I (German) propaganda slogan. We do not mean to imply
that these interests act like or have the popular attributes then or now of Huns, much less
Nazis. There appears in the recent political anti-income tax rhetoric, however, in Professor
Lee's populist eyes trained by an educated understanding of German culture in the early
Twentieth Century, at least a faint similarity of conviction as to the righteousness of the
cause and perhaps an undertone of long-resented subordination in the case of some of the
congressional leadership interested in this tax issue, probably more justified than in the case
of the World War I German folk. The Nazis were considerably less self-righteous but
infinitely more vengeful and above all opportunistic, unprincipled, and treacherous. We
cheapen the lessons of history to apply World War II terms to the prevalent American
political factions.
See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996). The airline also performed "hot section
inspections" of the air intake systems of its aircraft on a one to two year cycle at% to% the
cost of a major engine inspection and overhaul. See id. The auditing agent did not challenge
the airline's immediate deduction of these costs. See id.
See id. Actually every six to seven thousand flight hours (turning more on number of
landings than anything else) triggered an inspection. This article like the Technical Advice
Memorandum uses the rough equivalent of four years. See id. The purpose for such
inspections and resultant overhauls was to ensure aircraft reliability and passenger
safety-"airworthiness." See id. We thank the many who have educated us as to the
mechanics of replacing and reconditioning aircraft engines as part of such safety inspections
and the applicable tax accounting methods for rotable parts. In particular the aid of Eric
Smith, a second-year law student at the College of William and Mary, Ken Kempson, and
Professor Gene Seago was invaluable.
See id.
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useful lives of the engines. 5 The airline could recover the so
capitalized costs through depreciation over an eight-year period. 6
The airline industry feared that this conclusion would raise the
after-tax costs of inspections because the standard industry practice
deducted them currently. The airlines collectively spend about nine
billion dollars each year on inspections and maintenance with onethird attributable to major engine inspections. 7 The airline
industry asserts that a change from the practice of deducting these
costs to capitalizing them would increase the industry's tax cost by
one billion dollars over eight years. 8 Such an increase would
significantly raise the industry's cost of complying with the FAA
required inspections.
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer, RTex., wrote former Commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson
requesting reversal of the T.A.M.'s treatment of these safety
efforts. 9 He argued that these costs were deductible incidental
repairs and that the Service was using ambiguous interpretations
of the Supreme Court's. decision in INDOPCO, Inc. v.

Id.
' See I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(C)(ii) (providing a seven-year recovery period for the general
residual class of items of personal property into which aircraft fall). The recovery period for
aircraft would be used instead ofthe period for an engine specifically because section 168 does
not permit taxpayers to depreciate structures on a component-by-component basis. See I.R.C.
§ 168(i)(6). Depreciation deductions for property with a seven-year recovery period would be
taken over eight tax years due to the half-year convention that treats all property acquired
during the year as being placed in service on the mid-point of that tax year. See I.R.C. §
168(d). Depreciation not taken during the first half of the first tax year is taken in the eighth
year.
7
See Matthew L. Wald, An I.R.S. Ruling Ruffles Airline Industry Feathers, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 5, 1996, at 1-38.
See id. (citing Air Transport Association Lawyer Richard A. Janis) (reporting that the
one billion dollars consists of interest on additional payments due for past years plus the
higher tax cost of depreciating the expenditure over longer periods rather than deducting the
total all at once); accord David Field, IRS Rule Change Upsets Airlines: Repair Deduction a
Safety "Pena.lty," USA Today, Oct. 8, 1996, at B6; A New Tax Burden on Crucial Airline Safety
Check-ups Draws Fire, Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1996, at Al.
Letter from Rep. Bill Archer, R-Tex., Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee,
to Margaret Milner Richardson, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Sept. 19,
1996) [hereinafter Archer Letter], reprinted in Archer Letter to Commissioner About FAAInspection Costs, 96 Tax Notes Today 198-43 (Oct. 9, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file,
elec. cit. 96 TNT 198-43).
5
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Commissioner 10 to expand the capitalization doctrine. 11
importantly, however,
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More

[a]t a time when we should be doing everything possible to
improve aviation safety, I am concerned that the Internal
Revenue Service position represents a new tax burden on critical
airline safety inspections and repairs.
Moreover, funds
potentially available for additional safety efforts could instead be
claimed by the Internal Revenue Service. I believe this Internal
Revenue Service position is inconsistent with the views recently
expressed by Vice President Gore as a result of his commission's
review of airline safety issues and with President Clinton's even
more recent call for increased spending on airline safety. 12

503 U.S. 79 (1992). In INDOPCO, the Court addressed "whether certain professional
expenses incurred by a target corporation in the course of a friendly takeover are deductible
by that corporation as 'ordinary and necessary' business expenses." Id. at 80. The Court
capitalized the expenses on the grounds ofthe long-term benefits that accrued to the target
from the acquisition. See id. at 88-90.
11
Archer Letter, supra note 9.
12
Archer Letter, supra note 9. The reference to "funds ... claimed by the Internal Revenue
Service" echoes the Republican rhetoric of the debate over whom does income belong to-the
government or the taxpayer. See, e.g., Michael Wines, House Votes to Cut Taxes by $189
Billion Over 5 Years as Part of G.O.P. "Contract," N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1995, at A1, B10
(quoting House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Archer, R-Tex.) ("I have a simple
message for the Democrats: it's not your money; it's the taxpayers' money."); cf. 142 Cong.
Rec. H5338 (daily ed. May 21, 1996) (Remarks of Rep. Bill Archer) ("Congress treated the
public's money as if were Congress' own."). What Chairman Archer appears to really oppose
is progressivity. Representing one of the half-dozen most affluent congressional districts, see
David E. Rosenbaum, With a Passion {or Tax Cuts, and in Power, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1995,
at A1, he naturally wants to take care of high income individuals. A signature Archer
metaphor is providing "fuel for the engine that pulls the train of economic growth," Wines,
supra. In other words, "affluent taxpayers must receive tax breaks because they are mainly
the ones who invest money and create jobs for others." Rosenbaum, supra. Chairman
Archer's more recent signature phrase involves tearing the Code out by its roots. See Archer
10

Announces Hearing on Replacing Federal Income Tax and Its Impact on Small Business,
reprinted in W&M Schedules Hearing on Effect of Tax Reform on Small Business, 96 Tax
Notes Today 65-19 (Apr. 2, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 65-19).
The two goals seem related: tearing the progressive income tax out by its roots would provide
fuel for the engine. We presume that Chairman Archer is sincere in his belief that cutting
taxes at the top will trickle down through general increase in productivity and standard of
living (or at least its maintenance). We read the record as showing to the contrary that the
trickle down experiments of the 1978 and 1981 tax cuts failed in that respect-any trickle
down was from the top 1% to the top 5% or so of families. See John W. Lee, Current
Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 53-55 (1995) [hereinafter
Capital Gains Contentions]. Certainly Bill Clinton, then-governor of Arkansas, played the
populist rhetoric of failed trickle down economics with much skill and success in his 1992
Presidential Campaign. See John W. Lee, President Clinton's Capital Gains Proposals, 59
Tax Notes 1399, 1400 (June 7, 1993). That is why Lee defended President Clinton's then-
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Chairman Archer's letter broached the idea that the deductibility
of the inspection costs was supported by the FAA safety policy
rather than by federal tax policy. Thirty-one bipartisan members
of the House Ways and Means Committee drafted a second letter to
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin concurring with Chairman
Archer's conclusions. 13 They asserted: "Clearly the IRS is
overstepping its authority in attempting to impose this tax penalty
on air safety." 14
IRS Chief Counsel Stuart Brown, on behalf of Commissioner
Richardson, replied to Chairman Archer. 15 Brown insisted that the
Service has consistently issued rulings "holding that INDOPCO
does not change the fundamental legal principles" of
capitalization. 16 Accordingly, Brown concluded that the T.A.M.
properly characterized the costs as capital expenditures for the
populist reputation against a right wing knock-off of the scurrilous, populist "Mellon Ditty"
from the 1920's. John W. Lee, "Death and Taxes" and Hypocrisy, 60 Tax Notes 1393 (Sept.
6, 1993).
13
Letter from Mac Collins et al., Representative, U.S. House of Representatives, to Robert
E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury (Sept. 26, 1996), reprinted in Reps' Letter to Rubin on
IRS's New Capitalization Position, 96 Tax Notes Today 196-51 (Oct. 7, 1996) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 196-51).
14
Id.
15
Letter from Stuart L. Brown, Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, to Bill Archer,
Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Brown Letter],
reprinted in IRS Chief Counsel's Response to Archer on FAA-Inspection Costs, 96 Tax Notes
Today 198-44 (Oct. 9, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 196-51).
16
Id.; "c{ T.A.M. 96-41-004 (June 25, 1996)(citing various rulings asserting that INDOPCO
confirmed, without changing, capitalization principles); Letter from Thomas J. Smith,
Internal Revenue Service, to William F. Clinger, Chairman of the House Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 8, 1996), reprinted
in IRS Response to Clinger on FAA-Inspection Costs, 96 Tax Notes Today 200-13 (Oct. 11,
1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 200-13). In fact, INDOPCO did not
change the fundamental legal principles governing capitalization; however, most people had
not understood those principles but had instead been applying the erroneous "no separate
asset" test to deduct many future benefit expenses. See John W. Lee, Doping Out the
Capitalization Rules After INDOPCO, 57 Tax Notes 669, 669 (Nov. 2, 1992) [hereinafter
Capitalization Rules] (quoting Ecclesiastes' observation that what appears to be new actually
occurred before). Brown himself acknowledged that the Service discovered while setting
"standards in the aftermath of INDOPCO [that] 'we ... don't know what the pre-INDOPCO
standard was."' Brown Lists Factors That Could be Used to See if Cleanup Costs Must be
Capitalized, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Mar. 10, 1993, at G-11 (quoting Associate Chief Counsel
Stuart Brown). This confusion is amply manifested in the twists and turns of the Service's
approach to capitalization rules. See John Lee et al., Restating Capitalization Standards and
Rules: The Case for Rough Justice Regulations (Part One), 23 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 631 (1997)
and (Part Two), 23 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Rough Justice] (outlining the
various approaches in the Service's rulings).
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improvement of property instead of adopting Archer's
characterization as incidental repairs. 17 In particular, "[t]he major
inspections involve the replacement or reconditioning of a large
portion of the engine's component parts; upon completion of these
procedures, the engine's value was materially increased and its
service life was substantially prolonged."18 Finally, Brown assured
Archer that the Service shared Congress' concem for airline safety;
however, Brown asserted that the T.A.M. merely applied current
tax law to an airline 19 without addressing any safety issues. 20
Chairman Archer expressed disappointment with Brown's
response, 21 complaining that IRS disapproval of the airline
industry's long-standing practice of deducting the costs not only
failed to provide any rationale for its new interpretation of
capitalization standards but even failed to acknowledge that this
was a new interpretation. 22 Moreover, Archer asserted that the
Service's position contradicted the Clinton Administration's support
·for airline safety by imposing a "new tax burden" on the airlines. 23
Brown Letter, supra note 15.
Brown Letter, supra note 15.
19
Brown Letter, supra note 15. Brown insisted that a T.A.M. is taxpayer specific-it is
based on one taxpayer's specific factual circumstances and cannot be cited as precedent by
other taxpayers. I d. Others assert "[t]hat's not the real world" because agents will rely on
the reasoning of the T.A.M. to support its conclusions when auditing other airlines. Tom
Herman, Airlines Decry IRS Move as Threat to Safety, Broader Than Apparent, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 10, 1996, at B4 (quoting former IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander); accord Letter
from Bill Archer, Chairman of House Ways and Means Committee, to Margaret Milner
Richardson, Commissioner ofthe Intemal Revenue Service (Oct. 8, 1996) (noting that agents
already were using the T.A.M. in audits of other airlines) [hereinafter Archer Reply],
reprinted in Archer Letter to Commissioner About IRS Refusal to Change Inspection Cost
Policy, 96 Tax Notes Today 198-45 (Oct. 9, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96
TNT 198-45). As discussed below, the fact that the IRS National Office of Appeals put aircraft
engine inspection costs on the "significant issues" list in 1992, List of Significant Issues in the
Internal Revenue Service Industry Specialization Program, Accompanied by Explanation by
John Monaco, Executive Director, IRS Coordinated E=mination Programs, reprinted in Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA), Dec. 23, 1992, at L-29, is far more relevant than the holding of the T.A.M.
"' Brown Letter, supra note 15.
21
Archer Reply, supra note 19.
22
Archer Reply, supra note 19.
23
Archer Reply, supra note 19. Archer has vowed that income taxes will not be raised
during his tenure. See Unofficial Transcript of June 8 W&M Hearing on Tax Reform, 96 Tax
Notes Today 116-54 (June 15, 1995) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 95 TNT 116-54)
("Well, I would contemplate that as long as I'm chairman ofthis committee that none ofthese
plans will raise taxes."). He may mean that taxes will not be raised by the IRS as well as by
new Congressional enactments.
17
18
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Simultaneously, the House Budget Committee Report expressed
dissatisfaction with the Service's refusal to take into account FAA
safety policies. 24 Such late 1996 Congressional disapproval ofthe
Service's position forewarns of potential Congressional interference
aimed at preserving the government's policy on air safety. It
appears unlikely at this time that Congress will address this issue
with substantive legislation due to the pay-go rules that would
require it to find a revenue raiser to offset the Joint Committee on
Taxation computed hypothetical revenue loss created by
subtracting, pursuant to statutory authorization, these costs
immediately (as they currently do in the real tax world) 25 from a
hypothetical baseline in which these costs are properly capitalized
and amortized. This absurdity suggests that the pay-go rules
should be modified to allow enactment of simplification rules
codifying a widespread but conceptually incorrect practice without
creating a hypothetical revenue loss.

24
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863, at 1149 (1996) 142 Cong. Rec. H11644, H12009 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 1996) ("[T]he conferees urge the IRS to reverse its recent position on [the] tax
treatment of aircraft inspection and safety costs.").
25
The "pay-go" procedures of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, as extended
by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, require estimated revenue decreases
under federal tax legislation to be offset by increases in revenues or decreases in spending to
produce no net increase in the estimated federal deficit. See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-byNumbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 611-12 (1995); Barbara Kirchheimer,
Reconciliation Perspective: A Look Back to See Where We're Headed, 59 Tax Notes 158 (Apr.
12, 1993); Capital Gains Contentions, supra note 12, at 57; Alexander Polinsky, What is the
Deficit Trust Fund?, 60 Tax Notes 1295, 1296 (Sept. 6, 1993). Revenue decreases usually
come from "tax expenditures," defined as "reductions in individual and corporate income tax
liabilities that result from special tax provisions or regulations that provide tax benefits to
particular taxpayers. These special tax provisions can take the form of exclusions, credits,
deductions, preferential tax rates, or deferrals oftax liability." Joint Committee on Taxation,
Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 1997-2001 2 (Nov. 26, 1996), reprinted
in JCT Releases Five-Year Forecast of Tax Expenditure Costs, 96 Tax Notes Today 231-6
(Nov. 27, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 231-6). "Special income tax
provisions are referred to as tax expenditures because they are considered to be analogous
to direct outlay programs, and the two can be considered as alternative means of
accomplishing similar budget policy objectives. Tax expenditures are most similar to those
direct spending programs that have no spending limits, and that are available as
entitlements to those who meet the statutory criteria established for the programs." !d. For
an enlightening sampling of the literature, see Paul L. Caron et al., Federal Income Tax
Anthology 296-312 (1997). Under the pay-go rules, the ideal rule of capitalization/
depreciation as to cyclical safety aircraft engine overhauls is included in the base line so that
a new statute allowing expensing would be counted as a revenue loser. In actuality, this
provision would not increase the deficit because the taxpayers already were expensing the
costs and not paying tax on the hypothetically correct income.
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Rather than adopting such a sensible bookkeeping reform,
congressional tax leadership appears more likely to resort to
procedural legislation, generically known as "limitation riders"
even when appearing in Committee bills rather than in a floor
amendment, that would bar the Service from requiring the
capitalization of overhaul costs until the Service takes account of
FAA safety policies. 26 Although the limitation riders might entail
an explicit ban on the Service's enforcement of capitalization
standards in this area, the placement of a statement of disapproval
of the Service's position in the 1997 appropriations bill hints that
Congress might simply refuse to finance the Service's enforcement
activities. 27
(Professor Lee understands, primarily from
conversations with former Treasury Deputy Tax Legislative
Counsel and Chief ofthe Joint Committee Staff (and, in between,
Professor of Law at the Universities ofVirginia and Pennsylvania)
Harry Gutman, that given the current institutional "culture" of
Congress refusal to fund is less viable than a ban on enforcement
of a particular tax policy.) Curiously, the motivation for this
congressional micromanagement of tax regulation . ostensibly
derives from safety concems and not the Service's administration
of the tax laws. (The no new tax increase notion appears the driving
force for some.)
In particular, the congressional leadership states that it seeks to
achieve a policy coordinated between the Service and those

See, e.g., Archie Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS
Experience, 89 Yale L.J. 1360, 1370-75, 1371 n.77, 1372 n.85 (1980) (cataloging instances
during 1975-80 when Congress prohibited the IRS from executing certain aspects of the tax
law in the areas of (a) salary reduction plans, (b) oil production-sharing contracts, (c)
employee tips paid by credit card, (d) publishers' prepublication costs, (e) travel expenses, (0
private non-qualified deferred compensation plans, (g) fringe benefits, (h) employee and
independent contractor classifications, (i) losses of tax-exempt status for racially
discriminating schools, and (j) contributions to tax-exempt religious schools for educational
purposes). At the Virginia Tax Study Group's [hereinafter VTSG] Spring 1997 Symposium
the father of the VTSG as well of so much else in the Code, Emeritus Professor Edwin Cohen
(former Under Secretary of Treasury who most notably designed and presented the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 to the tax writing Committees and co-authored the 1954 American Law
Institute Corporate Tax Proposals and whose hands-on experience with income taxes begins
with the Revenue Act of 1936) noted that the "limitation rider" which he had fashioned for
the publishers was in a regular tax act (section 2119 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976) and
remained in effect for a decade as to publishers (until section 263A of the 1986 Code was
enacted). See infra note 88.
27
See supra note 24.
26
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agencies concerned with safety. 28 This raises the question of when
and how the Service should consider non-tax policies affected by the
tax laws. Ultimately, this issue turns more on tax politics than on
tax policies. If the Service simply reversed the cyclical aircraft
engine maintenance T.A.M. with a tersely worded ruling-as it did
with the soil remediation T.A.M.,29 every other industry faced with
a new post-INDOPCO ruling would tend to challenge it politically. 30
Conversely, if the Service did not consider FAA policy and/or hold
public hearings to consider cyclical safety overhauls, then Congress
might use limitation riders to suspend the application of the
T.A.M.'s reasoning. Either way, the Service might well find its
whole post-INDOPCO strategy of incrementalism, described
immediately below, much more trouble than it ever could have been
worth.
This article elaborates on the open letter written by Professor
John Lee to Commissioner Richardson in partial support of the
cyclical aircraft engine safety inspection T.A.M.'s conclusions 31 and
offers negotiated rule making as a defusing technique to address
the above problems. The article recommends that the Service
abandon its apparent strategy of establishing capitalization rules
incrementally through audit, litigation, and occasional rulings. As
described more fully in Rough Justice, Political Science Professor
Charles Lindblom, aptly dubbing that approach "Muddling
Through,"32 recommends it where an administrative agency is

28

See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863, supra note 24, at 1149 ("The conferees are also
concerned that this policy change, which affects the entire airline industry and critical airline
safety policies, was implemented without apparent input from and coordination with other
interested parties such as the Department of Transportation and the FAA.").
29
See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (reversing T.A.M. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992)); infra
notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
3
° Cf Art Pine, Congress Stirs Up IRS Enforcement, Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1978, at E1
(describing congressional action inspired by constituents upset by an IRS ruling).
31
See Letter from John Lee, Professor, William and Mary Law School, to Margaret Milner
Richardson, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (Sept. 30, 1996) [hereinafter Lee
Letter) (agreeing with the need to capitalize the overhaul costs but suggesting a four-year
recovery period for the capitalized costs as a freestanding depreciable intangible, much like
a financial accounting "deferred charge"), reprinted in Professor Says IRS Shouldn't Change
Position on Capitalizing Costs ofAirplane Engine Overhauls, 96 Tax Notes Today 204-11 (Oct.
18, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 204-11).
32
Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 Pub. Admin. Rev. 79
(1959).
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unsure of the best rules or, as appears to be the instant case, where
there are conflicts inside the agency. 33 Such intra-agency conflicts
appear to exist in the Service between (a) the higher levels of Chief
Counsel, and (b) the National Office of Appeals as reported by the
tax press 34 and, according to comments at the Virginia Tax Study
Group by Glenn Carrington and Ken Kempson, regional chief
counsel as well who are eager to establish the boundaries of
capitalization/expensing through litigation. We strongly
recommend in Rough Justice and again here that the Service utilize
instead the medium of more global structured discretionary justice
regulations as conceptualized by University of Chicago Law School
Administrative Law Professor Kenneth Culp Davis in his landmark
Discretionary Justice, a Preliminary lnquiry. 35 Such regulations
should set forth (a) the clear reflection of income standard for
capitalization versus expensing, (b) rough justice rules for
implementing such standard, and (c) directions for applying those
rules under fully articulated balancing tests. Going beyond the
advice in the open letter, 36 this article advocates that the Service
formulate such structured discretionary rough justice regulations
through negotiated rulemaking with other agencies appropriately
represented during the discussions of certain topics affecting non-

See Rough Justice, supra note 16.
See Minutes of Tax Executives Institute-Internal Revenue Service Liaison Meeting
November 19, 1996, [hereinafter TEl-IRS Liaison Minutes] (Remarks of Chief Counsel Stuart
Brown) reprinted in TEl Releases Minutes of IRS, Treasury Liaison Meetings 97 Tax Notes
Today 20-46 (Jan. 30, 1997) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 97 TNT 20-46).
35
Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice, A Preliminary Inquiry 103 (LSU Press 1969);
cf. John W. Lee, The Art of Regulation Drafting: Structured Discretionary Justice Under
section 355, 44 Tax Notes 1029, 1032 (Aug. 28, 1989).
36
See Lee Letter, supra note 31. This initial reaction to avoid deciding tax treatment on
non-tax policy grounds at least put Professor Lee in good company-i.e., the Treasury and
Service officials responsible for reviewing the soil remediation T.A.M. See Andrew J.
Roemer, Service Ponders Environmental Cleanup Costs; Carrington Uncertain of Outcome,
93 Tax Notes Today 102-10 (May 12, 1993) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 93 TNT
102-10) ("The denial of deductibility was not based on environmental policy, and the current
review of the treatment of environmental costs will not consider environmental policy ....
'Environmental impact is an issue for legislators and policymakers. My job is to only
interpret the law .... "') (quoting Associate Chief Counsel Glenn Carrington); cf Treasury
Official Sees Environmental Clean-up Guidance This Year as Warranted, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), May 10, 1993, at G-14 (considering environmental guidance that promotes both public
policy and tax policy goals). The reaction of members of the VTSG at the Spring 1997
Symposium was much the same.
33
34
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tax policies. 37 This approach should seek to replicate the best of the
prior collegial tax reform experiences.
Following these
recommendations, the Service could take major steps toward
simplifying the capitalization rules and reducing the tax law's
interference in business decisions.
Part II advances a rough justice concept that seeks fair results
through easy-to-apply rules. These rules create a minimal
distortion of income when compared with their capitalization-cumdepreciation counterpart. This part explains the rationales behind
rough justice, puts forth four rough justice exceptions to
capitalization,
and
advocates
promulgating
structured
discretionary justice regulations incorporating these exceptions.
Part Ill applies these rough justice exceptions in the context of the
aircraft maintenance T.A.M.
Finally, part IV presents
considerations of public policy important to interpretation of the tax
laws. This part first demonstrates that the Service previously has
considered the impact on non-tax policies in several areas when
interpreting the Code. Then this part advances a two-prong test
that looks to a congressional or judicial identification of a policy
overlap and requires a severe frustration of the non-tax policy
before the Service considers the non-tax policy. This part concludes
that in the case of the airline maintenance T.A.M., the Service
should use a negotiated rulemaking strategy to take into account
the safety policies of the FAA.

37

See generally Administrative Conference of the United States, Negotiated Rulemaking
Source Book (1990); Daniel J. Fiorino, Dimensions of Negotiated Rule-making: Practical
Constraints and Theoretical Implications, in Conflict Resolution and Public Policy 141
(Miriam K. Mills ed., 1990); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise,
71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1982); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution:
The Development of Negotiated Rulemaking and Other Processes, 14 Pepp. L. Rev. 863 (1987);
Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking,
3 Yale J. on Reg. 133 (1985).
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II. "ROUGH JUSTICE" OR "MORE-TROUBLE-THAN-IT'S-WORTH
EXCEPTIONS" 38 TO CAPITALIZATION OF FUTURE BENEFIT
EXPENDITURES

Sections 16239 and 26340 intend to more accurately calculate net
income 41 by generally matching 42 expenses with revenue in the
taxable period in which the expenses actually generate that
revenue. 43 Justice Blackmun advanced this conceptually sound
idea recently in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner44 and two decades

NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 953 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter NCNB I),
rev'd en bane, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982), overruled, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); see NCNB I, 651
F.2d at 961 (noting "situations involving considerations of pragmatism and uncertainty").
39
I.R.C. § 162(a) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .... ").
40
I.R.C. § 263(a) (denying deductions for most capital expenditures).
41
Taxing net annual income is a fundamental policy of the Code. See 50 Cong. Rec. 3849
(1913) (remarks of Sen. Williams). Today the keystone is section 446's mandate that a
taxpayer's method of income tax accounting must clearly reflect income. See I.R.C. § 446(b).
A taxpayer's practice of expensing or capitalizing an expenditure is a method of accounting.
See Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36; Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-1 C.B. 8; G.C.M. 39,328 (Jan. 23,
1985) ("A material item is defined as any item which involves the proper time for the
inclusion ofthe item in income or the taking of a deduction. Clearly, the taxes, interest and
loan fees at issue constitute material items since the decision whether to capitalize or
expense such items involves the appropriate time for taking a deduction.") (citation omitted).
42
That match is by no means exact. Rather capitalized costs are "added" to the basis of
an asset, see I.R.C. § 1016, and then depreciated over the estimated useful life or recovery
period at varying rates of depreciation. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 168. Capital recovery often occurs
over a much shorter period than the actual useful economic life. Only by pure chance would
the depreciation deductions actually match the resulting income.
43
See generally Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting,
4 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (1984); cf H.R. Rep. No. i04-586, at 140 (1996) (referring to sections 167(g)
and 263A for which "in theory, the income forecast method is an appropriate method for
matching the capitalized cost of certain property with the income produced by such
property"); George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. Penn. L. Rev.
1179, 1184 n.15 (1987) ("A currentfad in tax policy is ... the financial accounting notion of
'matching."').
« 503 U.S. 79 (1992). In espousing the matching notion, Justice Blackmun stated that:
[t]he primary effect of characterizing a payment as either a business expense or a capital
expenditure concerns the timing of the taxpayer's cost recovery: While business
expenses are currently deductible, a capital expenditure usually is amortized and
depreciated over the life of the relevant asset, or, where no specific asset or useful life
can be ascertained, is deducted upon dissolution of the enterprise. Through provisions
such as these, the Code endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable
period to which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate
calculation of net income for tax purposes.
I d. at 83-84 (citations omitted).
38
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earlier in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co. 45 to explain that when
an expenditure offers benefits in future periods, the expenditure
should be capitalized instead of expensed to accurately reflect net
income.
Why should the doctrinal and tax policy analysis not stop with
future benefit? Arguably, the cyclical overhauls yield substantial
future benefit for a four-year period and therefore should be
capitalized and amortized over that period. (Of course depreciation
over an eight-year period of an expenditure repeated every four
years distorts the taxpayer's income. Judge Sterrett provided the
answer in Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 46 which
Glenn Carrington introduced into the Chief Counsel's quiver of
capitalization precedent and doctrine.)47 Treasury, as well as some
academics, advocates capitalization and depreciation for all multiperiod costs. 48 Otherwise, as a Tax Notes Today article put it,
airlines receive tax advantages and preferences over other forms of
transportation that must capitalize their overhaul and
reconditioning costs. 49 The short answer to the above question is

45

418 U.S. 1 (1974). Focusing on the purpose of depreciation in tax accounting, the Court
stressed that depreciation serves to allocate the cost of an asset to the various periods that
benefit from the asset use. See id. at 10-11.
When the asset is used to further the taxpayer's day-to-day business operations, the
periods of benefit usually correlate with the production of income. Thus, to the extent
that equipment used in such operations, a current depreciation deduction is an
appropriate offset to gross income currently produced. It is clear, however, that different
principles are implicated when the consumption of the asset takes place in the
construction of other assets that, in the future, will produce income themselves. In this
latter situation, the cost represented by depreciation does not correlate with production
of current income.
Id. at 11.
•• 72 T.C. 1 (1979).
47
For the Carrington-Lee-Wolfsen Land & Cattle story, see Miscellaneous Revenue Issues:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means (Part 2), 103d Cong., 1689, 1702 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearings) (Prepared
Statement of Professor Lee).
·
48
See 2 U.S. Dep't Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic GrowthGeneral Explanation 202-11 (1984).
49
John Godfrey, Bipartisan Group Says Reverse IRS Decision on Plane Inspections, 96 Tax
Notes Today 196-3 (Oct. 7, 1996). See, e.g., LaSalle Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1375 (1963) (capitalizing the costs to overhaul truck engines); Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2
C.B. 36 (capitalizing substantial costs for cyclical overhauls of freight-train cars). Some
commentators distinguish Revenue Ruling 88-57 from the aircraft engine overhauls because
the railway car overhauls take place at the otherwise end of their service life. See William
L. Raby & Burgess J.W. Raby, Capitalizing the Costs ofAircraft Engine Overhauls, 71 Tax

1997]

Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs

175

that courts, Congress, and the Service always have tempered the
absolute rule that future benefit requires capitalization with a host
of exceptions. 50 The story of these exceptions, which essentially
make the rule, provides the rationales and tax policies supporting
the judicial and administrative results.
The Supreme Court implicitly has recognized the role of these
exceptions.
In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan
51
Association -properly read for the general proposition that
expenditures should be capitalized when incurred to enhance or
create an asset producing substantial future benefit52-Justice
Blackmun warned that "the presence of an ensu:lng benefit that
may have some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses
concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable
year."53 Similarly in INDOPCO, Justice Blackmun acknowledged
that the mere presence of an incidental future benefit may not
warrant capitalization. 54 After sanctioning the use of exc~ptions,
however, the Court left to others the task of explaining and
cataloging the exceptions.

Notes 1221, 1222 (May 27, 1996).
50
See NCNB I, 651 F.2d .at 953 (noting that these exceptions allow a taxpayer "currently
to recognize some expenses even though theoretically nicety would suggest capitalization and
subsequent recognition. They may be called the 'more-trouble-than-it's-worth exceptions.'").
61
403 u.s. 345 (1971).
62
See Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 F.3d 799, 805-06 (8th Cir. 1996); Rev. Proc.
90-63, 1990-2 C.B. 664, 665; Rev. Rul. 89-23, 1989-1 C.B. 85; G.C.M. 39,606 (Feb. 27, 1987);
T.A.M. 96-41-004 (June 25, 1996); T.A.M. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996); T.A.M. 90-24-003 (Mar.
2, 1990).
53
Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 354. This statement served as the peg for the development
of the separate asset doctrine. See John W. Lee & Nina R. Murphy, Capital Expenditures:
A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 475-84 (1981) (discussing the
development of the separate asset doctrine). Several commentators showed that the separate
asset doctrine was unsound and was not mandated by Lincoln Savings. See, e.g., Alan Gunn,
The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. Indus. &
Com. L. Rev. 443 (1974); Lee & Murphy, supra, at 481-84. By and large, the doctrine
developed in reaction to IRS overreaching in requiring capitalization without allowing any
or only inadequate depreciation. See NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 959; John W. Lee, Start-up Costs,
Section 195, and Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-on Tax Reform, and
a Touch of Basics, 6 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 51-56 (1986) [hereinafter Start-up Costs and Clear
Reflection of Income].
54
See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87.
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A: The Rationales Underlying the Exceptions
Several rationales explain why exceptions generally temper the
otherwise absolute rule of capitalizing all costs producing future
benefit. These rationales consider costs that produce incidental
future benefits, a balancing of the benefits and burdens of
capitalization, and the role of administrative convenience in
applying the tax laws.

1. Incidental Future Benefit
The potential capitalization of all costs that generate future
benefit presents an overly expansive rule never intended for income
tax accounting. 55 The Supreme Court recognized this limitation in
INDOPCO by stating that incidental future benefits may not
require capitalization. 56 Tax Court Judge Tannenwald explored
this incidental future benefit limitation in Sun Microsystems, Inc.
v. Commissioner. 57 In Sun Microsystems, the taxpayer, a new hightech company, argued that the issuance of stock warrants to a new
major customer-with the exercise rights contingent upon the
volume of future purchases-constituted sales discounts, whereas
the Government argued that under INDOPCO's "new look" the
warrants should be capitalized as an investment made to develop

See 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 'II 20.4.1, at 20-67 (1st
ed. 1981). Professor Bittker explained:
[I]f the IRS seriously endeavored to disallow every cost contributing to the profits of
future periods, it would be necessary to divide almost every salary and advertising
expense between its immediate impact on the customer and its contribution to the
company's long-lived goodwill. Recognizing this fact of business life, the Supreme Court
has said that "the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is
not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the
taxable year."
Id. (quoting Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 354); cf Encylopaedia Britannica, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982) (same reasoning and example); John W. Lee,
A Blend o{Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 Tax L. Rev. 347, 462
(1974) ("[An] increase in earning power or benefit to future years is not alone sufficient [for
capitalization], otherwise all ordinary and necessary business expenditures resulting in
greater profit would have to be capitalized, which is not the law.").
66
See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87 ("[T]he mere presence of an incidental future
benefit-'some future aspect'-may not warrant capitalization.").
67
66 T.C.M. (CCH) 997 (1993).
65
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a long-term relationship with a customer. 58 Judge Tannenwald
responded:
We find it unnecessary to refine this claimed "new look" for the
purpose of our decision herein. . . . [T]he Supreme Court
recognized that, while realization of future benefits is important
in determining existence of a capital expenditure, "the mere
presence of an incidental future benefit-'some future
aspect'-may not warrant capitalization." INDOPCO .... "[T]he
anticipated long-term benefits to [the taxpayer] from the
relationship with [tl).e customer] were 'softer' and were
speculative, compared to the immediate benefits to [the taxpayer]
of the anticipated sales of computer workstations to [the
customer] under the Purchase Agreement."
We conclude that the instant situation falls within the
"incidental future benefit" category reflected in INDOPCO . ...
Indeed, the long-term benefits herein appear to be no different
than those present in stock options given to. employees which
were held not to impair their compensatory character even before
the enactment of the statutory framework that now exists. 59

Judge Tannenwald thus ruled that costs predominately
benefiting the current period justify an immediate deduction when
the remaining future benefit is incidental. Also he catalogued as
coming within the currently deductible/incidental future benefit
category authorities permitting current deduction of author's
prepublication costs, job seeking fees, and advertising costs. 60
•• ld. at 1002.
" Id. at 1005 (citations omitted).
60
I d. We conclude that the instant situation falls within the "incidental future benefit"
category reflected iniNDOPCO. Cf Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1365 (lOth Cir.
1982) (author's expenses in connection with a book to be published in future held deductible);
Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374 (1970) (fee in order to secure employment held
deductible); Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57 (INDOPCO does not preclude deduction of
advertising expenses having a future benefit); see Lee, "Doping out the Capitalization Rules
after INDOPCO," 57 Tax Notes 669 (Nov. 2, 1992); Note, "Deductibility of Takeover and
Non-Takeover Expenses in the Wake of lndopco," 45 Tax Law. 815 (1992). Indeed, the
long-term benefits herein appear to be no different than those present in stock options given
to employees which were held not to impair their compensatory character even before the
enactment of the statutory framework that now exists. See Commissioner v. LoBue, supra;
Union Chemical & Materials Corp. v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 540, 296 F.2d 221 (1961).
Sun Microsystems, supra, 66 T.C.M.(CCH) at 1005.
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Judge Tannenwald's Sun Microsystems list surely intentionally
echoes his citing of educational and advertising costs as currently
deductible despite future benefits over two decades earlier in his
concurring opinion in Primuth v. Commissioner. 61
Judge
Tannenwald's concurrence was the genesis of Professor Lee's
interest in doctrine permitting current deduction of expenses with
some future benefit (or profit). 62 When Professor Lee told this story
to retired Tax Court Judges Samuel Sterrett and Lapsley Hamblen
at the Virginia Tax Study Group [hereinafter VTSG] Spring 1997
Symposium, Judge Sterrett proudly, and deservedly so, noted his
authorship of Primuth, a sea change permitting deduction of
employee job seeking fees (which at that time appeared to have
more future benefit than they perhaps do today, with downsizing
and job uncertainty in the air). Judge Sterrett also was the author
of Wolfsen Land & Cattle treating a recurring maintenance cost
itself as a freestanding intangible (much like a deferred charge)
depreciable over the period of recurrence rather than associating it
with some much longer lived tangible asset. Thus he joins
distinguishedjurists, such as Judge Tannenwald, Seventh Circuit
61

54 T.C. 374 (1970).
I am in full agreement with the result reached by my colleagues in the majority and with
much of the reasoning in Judge Sterrett's careful and lucid analysis and his apparent
rejection of the subtle distinctions which seem to be developing in this area. To me, the
drawing of distinctions based upon the difference between "seeking" and "securing"
employment, upon whether the fee of the employment agency is contingent or payable
in any event, or upon whether the agency's efforts are successful or unsuccessful simply
adds unnecessary confusion and complexity to a tax law which already defies
understanding even by sophisticated taxpayers. I would similarly reject any attempt
to import a capitalization of expenditure concept into a situation such as is involved
herein. That concept has generally been confined to cases of acquisition of tangible
assets or intangible assets, such as a license or goodwill of a going business, or
preparation for engaging in a new field of endeavor. Compare Morton Frank, 20 T.C.
511 (1953) (prospective acquisition of newspaper businesses); with Manhattan Co. of
Virginia, Inc., 50 T.C. 78 (1968) (goodwill); and Arthur E. Ryman, Jr., 51 T.C. 799 (19.69)
(admission to the bar of a second State); and Nathania[ A Denman, 48 T.C. 439 (1967)
(preparation for a new field of endeavor). By way of contrast, current deductibility has
normally been permitted for advertising expenditures and for educational expenditures
to improve one's skills utilized in existing employment, even though there were
indications that some general benefit would in all probability last beyond the year of
expenditure. E.g., Consolidated Apparel Co., 17 T.C. 1570, 1582 (1952), affirmed in part
and reversed in part on other issues, 207 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1953) (advertising expenses);
Cosimo A Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695, 701 (1962) (educational expenses). Compare Harold
Haft, 40 T.C. 2 (1963).
Primuth, supra, 54 T.C. at 381-82 (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
62
See Bittker, supra note 55.
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Judge Richard Posner, and Justice Harry Blackmun, who have
shaped the capitalization/expensing doctrine.
Glenn Carrington indicated at the VTSG Spring 1997
Symposium that agents argue that Sun Microsystems is just a
discount case: We believe that Judge Tannenwald, while indicating
that such narrow analysis resolved the controversy in front of him,
deliberately pointed to the precedent and surely the analysis
(minimum distortion of income) that he at least would use to give
meaning to "incidental" future benefit. In any event, the Service
followed Sun Microsystems' incidental benefit reasoning in a T.A.M.
extensively discussing deductibility of pre-opening costs incurred
by a retailer opening new stores in the same field. 63 During the
weeks prior to opening a store, this retailer incurred costs for
employee hiring and training, inventory stocking, and initial
functioning such as postage, supplies, repairs, utilities,
communications, and security. 64 These costs were typical of those
incurred during the retailer's normal operations. 65 The T.A.M.
stated that not all expenditures that produce future benefits must
be capitalized. 66 Instead, the T.A.M. focused on whether the
benefits were short-lived such that the future benefit was
incidental. 67 In this case, the Service concluded that the need to
incur these costs again shortly, in the normal course ofbusiness,
indicated that these pre-opening costs provided only short-term
benefits. 68 Expenditures with incidental future benefit, like these
pre-opening costs, provide ample justification for an immediate
deduction: when the benefits are realized in the current period, the
expenditures should be immediately deductible to match the
expense with the resulting revenue.

See T.A.M. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996).
See id.
65
See id. (noting that the recurring nature of these costs provides support for a current
deduction because recurring costs resemble operating expenses whereas non-recurring costs
resemble capital expenditures).
·
66
See id. ("Capitalization is not required for every expenditure that produces a future
benefit.").
67
See id.
68
See id.
63
64

180

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 17:161

Rough Justice lauds this pre-opening T.A.M. and laments that
the "published" version in Revenue Ruling 96-62 69 is narrowly
limited to job "training provided in the ordinary course of the
taxpayer's business" with no other indication of rationale and not
addressing the business expansion issue. 70 Tax Executives
Institute, Inc. [hereinafter TEl] which had been the prime private
sector mover behind the Notice 96-7 71 request for comments finds
the ruling more helpful than not. 72 Glenn Carrington pointed out
at the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium, however, that the facts of the
recent business expansion T.A.M. disclose an abnormally high
annual employee turnover rate of 60% at many of taxpayer's
stores. 73 He indicated that revenue agents have sought to discount
the business expansion T.A.M.'s reasoning due to such high
tumover rates and even argue that because Revenue Ruling 96-62
was derived from this T.A.M., it too was distinguishable from more
usual business expansion with much lower tumover rates. Ken
Kempson flatly stated that when a T.A.M. or other ruling is
reviewed at a higher level and a ruling is then published by the
Service, the underlying T.A.M. is dead and buried for purposes of
analysis ofthe ruling. This is surely so for purposes of"substantial
authority," 74 but we believe less so as to the reasoning itself.
2. Balancing Benefits and Burdens
The Fourth Circuit panel in NCNB Corp. v. United States
[hereinafter NCNB I] described these exceptions as "situations
involving considerations of pragmatism and uncertainty in which,
with the blessing of the Commissioner, taxpayers may deduct
currently certain expenditures, notwithstanding the presence of

69

1996-53 I.R.B. 6.
Rough Justice, supra note 16.
71
1996-1 C.B. 359.
72
Timothy J. McCormally, Rev. Rul. 96-62: A Lump of Coal or a Nicely Wrapped Present?,
74 Tax Notes 797 (Feb.10, 1997).
73
See T.A.M. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996) (''Thus, the stores must continually hire and train
new employees to replace those that have resigned or have been terminated or promoted, and
train the employees that have been promoted or transferred for their new positions.").
74
See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (1996).
70
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probable future benefit."75 The panel majority dubbed these "moretrouble-than-it's-worth exceptions." 76 Although the author of the
NCNB I majority opinion probably intended a disparaging import
to the "more trouble" description, the phrase hits the nail squarely
on the head. It accurately captures the balancing process of
weighing the burdens of capitalization/depreciation with the
benefits of a more clear reflection of income resulting from that
capitalization. The Court of Claims' landmark pre-INDOPCO
decision Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. United
States 77 elucidates the proper role for such balancing test:
Where the burden on both taxpayers and Service to account for
each item of property separately is great, and the likelihood of
distortion of income is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and
so impracticable that it demands that nevertheless all items be
accounted for individually, no matter what the trouble or onus. 78
The Eighth Circuit implicitly endorsed such a balancing approach by
ruling in a pre-INDOPCO opinion that "[w]here the prospective benefit is

NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961. The court further elaborated:
The Commissioner allows current deductions for some repair and educational
expenditures which will benefit a taxpayer during subsequent tax years .... Finally,
there is a residuum of current expenditures which will have some future benefit but
which "cannot, as a practical matter, be associated with any other period" and allocation
of which "either on the basis of association with revenue or among several accounting·
periods is considered to serve no useful purpose.["] These are also currently deductible.
An example might be the salary of a high corporate officer whose time is not practically
allocable between present operations and future projects.
Id. at 961~62 (quoting Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4, §§ 155, 160 (American
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1970)) (footnotes omitted):
76
NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 953.
" 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
78
Id. at 572. The court found the distortion insignificant by comparing "both on a year-toyear basis and on a 17-year overall basis, the disallowed minimum rule expenses [i.e., current
deduction of all items costing less than $500] are fairly similar to the amount of depreciation
that would have been allowed under the defendant's [capitalization and depreciation]
method." Id. at 571-72. (Moreover, the after tax revenue would be even closer if the
additional administrative costs of capitalizing and depreciating were taken into account).
Professor Gunn pointed to the immediate deduction available for tools, professional books and
equipment, and work uniforms, concluding that
(i]n none of these cases will a current deduction reflect income more clearly than would
capitalization and depreciation, but the burden on the taxpayer of accounting for such
costs through capitalization and depreciati~n would not justifY the small increase in the
accuracy of determining taxable income that would result from capitalization.
Gunn, supra note 53, at 456-57.
75
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very slight, capitalization is not easily supported."79 Similarly, Judge
Posner relied in the landmark, oft-cited Encyclopaedia Britannica on a
balancing approach to rationalize the current deduction of steady-state
recurring expenditures when "the benefits of capitalization are unlikely
to exceed the accounting and other administrative costs entailed in
capitalization."80 While we understand from Glenn Carrington that
revenue agents may attempt to distinguish such ·authorities as decided
prior to INDOPCO, such a tack should not succeed in the courts. These
authorities all rest on the flexibility of the clear reflection of income
standard.

3. Administrative Convenience
The Service has never explicitly adopted a balancing approach to
resolving expensing versus capitalization issues. 81 From time to
time, however, the Chief Counsel's Office has recommended the
adoption of one or another of the rough justice exceptions to
capitalization under the rubric of "administrative convenience."82
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979).
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 215. Congress has approved of a balancing
approach for exceptions to the uniform capitalization rules. See S. Rep. No. 99-313, at 142
(1986) ("The [section 263A] regUlations may adopt other simplifying methods and
assumptions where, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury, the costs and other
burdens of literal compliance may outweigh the benefits."); id. at 140 (permitting
"appropriate exceptions where application of the rules might be unduly burdensome"). This
approval provided the basis for Notice 88-62, sec. 3.02, 1988-1 C.B. 548.
81
Two recent rulings contain oblique indications that some in the Service may be starting
to balance the benefits and burdens of capitalization/depreciation in assessing the desirability
of a current deduction. See T.A.M. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996) (citing Iowa-Des Moines for the
proposition that expenditures to produce current income are deductible currently even though
some incidental future benefit may result); T.A.M. 96-45-002 (June 21, 1996) (same
proposition).
82
See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 90-63, 1990-2 C.B. 664, 665 (providing safe harbor amortization
procedures for package design costs explicitly for "administrative convenience" to "minimize
disputes"); Rev. Proc. 89-17, 1989-1 C.B. 827 (same); cf G.C.M. 36,074 (Nov. 11, 1974) ("In
view of the lack of any demonstrable legislative purpose or legal reason, we think it
appropriate to consider questions of administrative convenience."); see also IRS
Environmental Cleanup Guidance May be Out by July, Official Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA),
May 11, 1993, at G-8 ("Asked whether IRS believes it has regulatory authority to 'arbitrarily'
require capitalization over a fixed period, such as five or [ten] years, [Associate Chief Counsel
Glenn] Carrington responded, 'It would be arbitrary, but we've done arbitrary-reasonably
arbitrary-things in the past.'"). Commentators referred to Revenue Procedure 90-63 as
"administrative grace." Hal Gann & Roy Strowd, INDOPCO-Time for the Second Shoe to
Drop, 69 Tax Notes 1045, 1047 (Nov. 20, 1995). Hopefully, the atypical situation involved
recommendations grounded in administrative considerations but urging the Service to avoid
a published ruling. 'See, e.g., G.C.M. 35,044 (Sept. 20, 1972) (accepting a position based on
79

80
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Unlike the balancing test, the administrative convenience rationale
focuses only on the excessive accounting burden necessary to
achieve conceptual purity. 83
For example, General Counsel Memorandum (G.C.M.) 33,968,
dealing with writers' prepublication costs, extensively discussed the
concept of administrative convenience. 84 The G.C.M. pointed out
that there was ample legal precedent for capitalizing prepublication
costs because they yield future benefits in the form of a manuscript
intended to produce royalties. 85 Nevertheless, it concluded that a
published ruling should permit a deduction for these costs based on
administrative considerations. 86
While there would thus appear to be a sound legal basis for
requiring authors to capitalize all of their expenses, such a
requirement gives rise to considerable practical difficulty ....
Particularly where such an author works on several projects
during a taxable year, ... it would be most difficult for him to
capitalize and allocate to particular projects all of his recurringtype costs, such as rent, supplies, and secretarial assistance. To
make such an allocation with any degree of accuracy would in
many cases require the use of a rather complex cost-accounting
system, based on careful records of time spent on various
projects. And in many cases the actual tax effect of recovering
expenses through capitalization would be little different from

administrative considerations that allowed a federal employee to include a payroll
check-dated January 1, 1971-in the employee's 1971 taxable income even though the
employee deposited the check in 1970 but suggesting that a published ruling be avoided to
prevent problems in defending this position).
83
Cf Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F .2d at 217 ("The administrative costs of conceptual
rigor are too great.").
84
See G.C.M. 33,968 (Nov. 18, 1968).
85
See id. The G.C.M. noted that
[t]he principal published rulings ... indicate a Service position to the effect that an
author may never currently deduct expenses incurred in writing books, but must
capitalize all expenses by allocating them to his basis in particular manuscripts. This
position would appear to have a sound legal basis in section 263(a), since it can be said
that expenses incurred by an author in writing a book are costs of improving the value
of property, i.e., the manuscript, within the meaning of section 263(a).

Id.
88

See id. ("The ruling to be published should make clear that the decision to permit
current deduction of overhead·type expenses is based on administrative, rather than legal
considerations, so that the Service will not be prejudiced in litigating cases ... in which it is
deemed appropriate to take a [legally based] position.~).
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recovering them through current deductions, since a professional
author may be expected to have continuing income from his
writing over the years, as well as continuing expenses of an
overhead nature . . . . In view of the foregoing considerations,
we believe the Service should adopt an administrative policy of
permitting professional writers to deduct currently their
expenses of a continuing nature, and we recommend publication
of a ruling to state such a policy. 87

The Service never issued such a ruling. Instead, the Government
lost in a refund suit where a professional writer asserted a current
deduction for prepublication costs. 88
In addition to practical considerations, the Chief Counsel
expressed some concems about problems with litigation that might
be avoided through administrative determinations. First, revenue
rulings and procedures that permitted deductions based on
administrative convenience could avoid the unpredictable results
oflitigation. 89 Courts were likely to reach inconsistent conclusions
under the Cohan doctrine 90 which would require a court to estimate
Id. (citation omitted); cf. G.C.M. 38,410 (June 18, 1980) ("While we believe our position
[requiring capitalization for costs with future benefit] has substantial merit, we accept your
[immediate deduction under a separate asset] approach . . . in view of the practical
considerations involved, including the lack of sympathetic appeal of our position due to the
total denial of deductions and the continued losses in the circuit courts."). Note the emphasis
on an increased burden to the taxpayer and minimal increase in revenue to the Treasury.
88
See Stern v. United States, 71-1 U.S.T.C. 'II 9375 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (permitting a current
deduction for a professional writer because the author is engaged in the trade or business of
writing and is not attempting to create an asset). Revenue Ruling 73-395, 1973-2 C.B. 87,
rejecting Stern, held that a publisher's prepublication costs incurred in creating, publishing
and distributing textbooks and visual aids did not constitute research and developmental
expenditures deductible under section 17 4 but instead should be capitalized under section
263 because part of the publisher's cost of producing and copyrighting a manuscript of a
literary composition thus resulting in the creation of an asset having a useful life extending
substantially beyond the close of the taxable year. This ignited a firestorm of criticism
ultimately resulting in section 2119 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which directed the Service
to administer sections 162, 174 and 263 as to publishers' prepublication expenditures without
regard to Revenue Ruling 73-395 and "in the same manner as they were consistently applied
by the taxpayers prior to the issuance of [such ruling]." See H.R. Rep. No. 94-658, at 338
(1975); Certain Committee Amendments to H.R. 10612: Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on
Fin. (Part 2), 94th Cong., 475-76 (1976) (statement of Townsend Hoopes, President,
Association of American Publishers, Inc., representing the Ad Hoc Committee for Equitable
Tax Treatment of the Publishing Industry).
89
See G.C.M. 34,262 (Jan. 30, .1970), considering Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65.
90
Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) (George Cohan was a famous
Broadway director who claimed astronomical entertainment expenses.).
87
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the useful life of a depreciable asset if it believed that the asset
declined in value or became obsolescent. 91 By adopting one
administrative determination of a class useful life or classes of such
lives, the inconsistent estimations resulting from litigation could be
avoided. Alternatively, a Cohan approximation of class lives for
depreciation of self-created intangibles would avoid the
unadministrability of varying depreciation periods for employee
training according to what surrogate assets the IRS or the taxpayer
can use to approximate the life of the business, e.g., nuclear
regulatory license, natural gas pumping license, plant building in
which the trained workforce works. 92 When Lee recited these
authorities at the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium, Ken Kempson
observed that such a case-by-case approach to depreciation of selfcreated intangibles is unadministrable. Certainly the history of
purchased intangibles in taxable corporate acquisitions prior to the
enactment of section 197 so suggests. 93 Moreover, the more
conceptually accurate approach would treat the workforce itself as
a freestanding depreciable intangible, which compounds the
administrative problems.
Second, the unpredictability oflitigation might lead to excessive
litigation. 94 Taxpayers believing that they might benefit from
courts' short estimations of useful lives under Cohan may choose to

91
See id. at 543-44 (noting that once a taxpayer shows that some amount was spent, a
court should fashion an estimation of the amount, otherwise "to allow nothing at all appears
to us inconsistent with saying that something was spent").
92
See Rough Justice, supra note 16.
93
General Accounting Office, Report to the Joint Committee on Taxation: Tax Policy, Issues
and Policy Proposals Regarding Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets (Aug. 9, 1991), reprinted
in GAO Report on Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets is Available, 91 Tax Notes Today 169-1
(Aug. 13, 1991) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 91 TNT 169-1); Tax Treatment of
Intangible Assets: Hearings before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 48
(1991) (prepared statement of Commissioner Fred Goldberg) ("From a tax administrator's
perspective, the present situation [as to amortization of purchased intangibles] is untenable
because it embroils the government in endless factual inquiries that are made more difficult
by unsettled case law. Some courts are sympathetic to arguments that certain intangible
assets can be distinguished from goodwill and therefore can be amortized. These decisions
are dependent on the facts of the particular case, and results may differ from court to court
depending on the legal principles considered controlling. What this means in practical terms
is that both taxpayers and the system suffer intolerable inequities, costs, and other
burdens."). .
94
See G.C.M. 34,262 (Jan. 30, 1970), considering Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65.
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litigate more often. 95 Or even worse as a matter of tax
administration and horizontal equity, their advisers may feel more
comfortable in "preparing" the return claiming a current deduction
of such self-created intangibles without fully di'sclosing the issue.
Nevertheless, the contradistinction between administrative
convenience and conceptual purity may have encouraged the
Commissioner to frequently ignore the Chief Counsel's
recommendations of simple solutions to the tax treatment of
expenditures benefiting present and future tax years. 96 Although
administrative. considerations certainly lie at the heart of tax
policy, future solutions to the expensing/capitalization puzzle
should not be couched in terms of "administrative convenience"
given the historical lack of acceptance by the Service, as evidenced
in never-implemented G.C.M.'s. These solutions should be
articulated as rough justice or equitable solutions: easier to
administer and fairer on average in lieu of more theoretically
correct rules. 97 In particular when the theoretical standard is the
clear reflection of income, rough justice rules implement a more
practical and minimal distortion of income gloss.

B. Rough Justice Rules
For purposes of this article, the core idea of rough justice is the
use of simple administrative rules that work well enough on
average 98 in lieu of either detailed rules pursuing theoretical purity
or case law uncertainty. The principal virtue ofthese rules is the
reduction of administrative costs to the taxpayer, to the Service,99

95

See id.
'
See Rough Justice, supra note 16.
97
Former Commissioner Fred Goldberg was a leading proponent of a rough justice
approach over more theoretically correct but administratively difficult approaches. See
Rough Justice, supra note 16.
98
The core concept of rough justice is the use of rules that entail simple application,
eliminate expensive factual inquiry, and achieve rational or just results in most cases. For
an extensive discussion of rough justice, see generally id. The ideas in the accompanying
paragraph in text are distilled from Rough Justice, supra note 16.
99
As a proponent of rough justice, Commissioner Goldberg was particularly concerned
about the transaction costs to the Service!I'reasury of establishing rules by litigation in the
capitalization arena. See id.
96
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or to both 100 while avoiding a distortion of income. Aside from
reducing compliance and enforcement costs, rough justice connotes
an approximation of the just result. In some cases, rough justice is
a "second best" surrogate or proxy tax; however, it generally seeks
to effect better rather than unjust results-fair on average for a
class of taxpayers but not necessarily just as to each affected
taxpayer. Jurisprudentially, rough justice may be viewed as equity
versus rule (equity versus law in the Anglo-American lexicon) or as
substance versus form-an age-old battle between the spirit and the
letter of the law. Under this view, rough justice envisions equity
overcoming the rule of law.
The Chief Counsel's analyses of rough justice expensing/
capitalization rules in several G.C.M.'s support the Commissioner's
use of these rules with the broad enforcement authority granted by
the clear reflection of income standard. The clear reflection of
income standard, embodied in section 446, 101 goes to the heart of
capitalization. 102 Basically stated, income is clearly reflected when
expenses are matched with related revenue.
Expensing/
capitalization rules that avoid a distortion of income, therefore,
should come within the Commissioner's authority to adopt those
rules. For example, in General Counsel Memorandum 34,959, the
Chief Counsel's Office recommended a "minimum capitalization
rule" as a practical guide to taxpayers with small items used in a
trade or business. 103 This rule automatically would have expensed
purchases under $100 and permitted expensing oflarger amounts
benefiting future years if that method of accounting "is generally
accepted by the accounting profession for that industry and

See Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 5-6, 6 n.S.
I.R.C. § 446(b) ("[T]he computation of taxable income shall be made under such method
as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income.").
102
See Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967) ("[S)ections 263
and 446 are inextricably intertwined. A contrary view would encase the general provisions
of section 263 with an inflexibility and sterility neither mandated to carry out the intent of
Congress nor required for the effective discharge of [the Service's) revenue-collecting
responsibilities."); accord. Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 569 ("This court agrees that the
capitalization and depreciation provision[s) ... and the method of accounting provision ...
are 'inextricably intertwined' and must be utilized in conjunction in deciding the ultimate
success of the taxpayer's method in clearly reflecting income.").
103
See G.C.M. 34,959 (July 25, 1972).
100
101
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produces no distortion of income." 104 The G.C.M. bottomed its
recommendation of this rule on the clear reflection of income
standard.
The scheme of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is to tax
income in the year it should properly be taxed pursuant to
appropriate accounting methods and standards. Thus, the
accounting provisions (e.g., Code §§ 446 and 461) generally
operate to override the more specific deduction or nondeduction
provisions. A deductible item is to be deducted in the year paid
or incurred unless a proper application of the accounting
provisions requires or permits a different result.
Code §§ 446 and 461 provide the general authority to prohibit
deductions in the year the expense item is paid or incurred if to
allow the deduction in that year would not clearly reflect income.
However, Code§ 446 (b) and (c) provides the Commissioner with
very broad authority to determine (1) whether a particular
taxpayer's method clearly reflects income, and (2) whether
particular methods of accounting generally may be used by
various taxpayers even though such methods may deviate in
certain respects from traditional tax accounting methods. Thus,
while we believe those provisions provide authority for the
Commissioner to prohibit deductions where· such is necessary to
prevent a distortion of taxable income, we also believe they
provide authority for the Commissioner to permit certain
deductions where a deduction is seemingly proscribed by a
particular provision of the Code.
We recognize that by regulations and long-standing ruling
practice the Service has definitely limited the Commissioner's
discretion in this area. However, we are unaware of any such
limits that would prevent the exercise of the discretion we now
propose .... [W]e believe section 461 gives the Commissioner
authority to direct the timing of deductions in a manner that will
clearly reflect income. Although the exercise of this authority
has generally been aimed at proscribing methods that fail to

104
I d. This minimum capitalization rule resembled the minimum expensing rule approved
in Cincinnati that enabled railroads to expense any expenditures under $500 in accordance
with the accounting system imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Cincinnati,
424 F.2d at 572. Professor Gunn noted that the 1954 ALI Draft Code contained a $500
minimum capitalization rule. See Gunn, supra note 53, at 457 n.61.
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clearly reflect income, there is little doubt that it is broad enough
to permit the recognition of additional methods that allow a clear
reflection of income, even though such methods may appear to be
a variance with a narrow interpretation of specific language of
the Code. 105

The G.C.M. concluded that a "small item carve-out" was permitted
under regulations that allowed expensing for both small items
actually consumed and those not consumed but consistently
expensed under the taxpayer's accounting method where the
consistency avoided income distortion. 106 The use of rough justice
rules, therefore, is authorized by the Commissioner's broad
authority to avoid a material distortion of income. 107
At the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium Ken Kempson pointed out
that a recurring cost exception with a two or three year interval
could be readily abused by high income taxpayers just as a timing
mismatch of three years was attempted in ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner. 108 Lee responded that the rough justice expensing
105

G.C.M. 34,959 (July 25, 1972) (citation omitted).
See id.
107
See id. ("[These) provisions are recognition that there is no absolute rule that capital
expenditures, in the strict traditional sense, must in all cases be capitalized. Rather the rule
is that such expenditures may be currently deducted if such treatment does not materially
distort income.").
108
73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997). There the attempted transaction was as follows:
Three parties form a partnership to acquire a liquid fixed-income security that is not
publicly traded. It may even be a security created just for this purpose by the investment
bank; the point is that it is liquid and readily valued. The partners have shares of
income and loss of90 percent, 9 percent, and 1 percent, which match their initial capital
contributions. The 90 percent partner is either not subject to U.S. tax liability, or may
be a U.S. taxpayer that needs to replenish its net operating loss carryovers. The 9
percent partner is the one in need of tax losses. The third partner is the investment
bank, there to keep the partnership going when the 90 percent partner leaves.
106

Shortly after its formation, the partnership sells the security in an installment sale;
there may be no economic gain. The partnership receives most of the proceeds
immediately, and the remainder, which is contingent, three years later. The contingent
part of the price could be calculated according to a formula that factors in interest. In
the second year, the 90 percent partner is redeemed out of the partnership for cash,
presumably equal to the remainder of its capital account.
The key to this arrangement is temporary reg. section 15A.453-1(c)(3)(i). If property has
been sold for a fixed-term installment obligation with a contingent total price, the
regulation requires that the seller recover basis ratably over the term of the obligation.
Temporary reg. section 15A.453-1(c)(3)(i) states that in a year when no payment is
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of expenditures with future benefits entails simplified accounting
methods generally denied to large taxpayers and, above all, to
shelters. Our Submission in response to Notice 96-7 109 asserted
that as a matter of tax policy rough justice rules based on
considerations of simplicity from the taxpayer's perspective should
be limited to small taxpayers. 110 Under present law, examples of
such limitations of simplified tax rules appear in the restriction of
the cash method of accounting111 and the treatment of farm
preparatory and livestock raising costs for small taxpayers. 112
However, retaining complexity for tax shelters is desirable.
Assist_ant Secretary of Treasury (Tax Policy) Buck Chapoton
articulated in a 1984 House Ways and Means Committee Hearing
on proposed tax accounting changes that complexity in tax rules
dealing with complicated tax shelters was acceptable. 113 There the
received or the amount of the payment is less than the basis allocated to that year, no
loss will be allowed unless that particular year is the final payment year. If no loss is
permitted, then the unrecovered basis allocated to that year is carried forward to the
next year.
In the Merrill-designed partnerships, the literal application of temporary reg. section
15A.453-l(c)(3)(i) allows the partners to recognize a large artificial gain in the first year,
90 percent of which is allocated to the partner who will owe no tax on it. In the second
and third years, the partnership recognizes large artificial losses, which will be allocated
90:10, respectively, to the two remaining partners, the original 90 percent partner.
having departed.
Lee A. Sheppard, "Hero of the Day" is a Thankless Job, 74 Tax Notes 1382, 1382-83 (Mar. 17,
1997).
109
1996-1 C.B. 359 (seeking comments on the need for guidance on capitalization principles,
the desired approaches of such guidance, and any safe harbor amortization periods for certain
expenditures). The final version of our Submission is being published as Rough Justice, supra
note 16.
0
"
See Rough Justice, supra note 16. Professor Lee's work-in-progress, "Still Chewing on
That Old Rag?": Writer's Prepublication Expenses Revisited After INDOPCO and New Section
167(g), develops this thesis further.
'" See I.R.C. § 448 (limiting the cash method of accounting to individuals and non-shelter
entities with gross receipts averaged over a three-year period ofless than five million dollars).
The scope of current section 448 allowing all individuals to use the cash method is somewhat
questionable on the basis of simplicity. Furthermore, permitting all personal service
corporations to use it clearly indicates political pressure and an origin oftradition rather than
simplicity.
2
"
See I.R.C. § 263A(d) (permitting the deduction of direct and indirect costs of producing
livestock or plants in cash basis farming businesses). ,
3
"
Tax Shelters, Accounting Abuses, and Corporate and Securities Reforms: Hearings before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 32-33 (1984) (statement of John "Buck"
Chapoton, Asst. Sec. (Tax Policy), Dep't of the Treasury) (stating that time value of money
rules contain exceptions for "normal transactions and apply principally to large tax
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complexity itself served as a transaction cost to retard tax shelter
use. Additionally by limiting rough justice rules to small taxpayers,
the retained complexity for large income individual and corporate
taxpayers might be justified as increasing the progressivity of the
effective tax rate on economic income, with regard to the high
income individual taxpayers (directly or as shareholders), via
higher compliance costs. 114 This increased progressivity-in addition
to achieving horizontal equity by treating airlines the same as
other large corporate taxpayers with multi-period costs- is the best
classic tax policy answer to House Ways and Means Chairman Bill
Archer's rhetoric of a tax on airline safety.
Descending from the grove at Academe to the rocky agora of
practicable tax ideas, administrative convenience from the Service's
perspective may militate in favor of extending rough justice rules
to large corporations as well as small businesses. Certainly this is
the Commissioner's judgment call. (But even in that event, high
income taxpayers should not be permitted to use such simplified
accounting methods to offset unrelated income, i.e., shelter other
income, as was attempted in ACM Partnership. Such a schedular
income rule would not be that different from the old Libson Shops
doctrine.) 115 The General Accounting Office reports that the biggest
section 162 issue on audit is capitalization versus expensing and
that this single Code section generates the largest dollar amount in
controversy for business taxpayers. 116 Rough justice rules might
serve to reduce or eliminate much of this controversy.
transactions, tax shelters, and otherwise, where very sophisticated planning is involved ..
. . I do not think we need to apologize when we complicate the Tax Code for very complicated
transactions, and that is the intent here.")
"' This assumes that corporate earnings are allocated to shareholders in the short-run and
owners of capital in general in the long-run, both of whom in the case of individuals are
mostly high income. See John W. Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly Traded
Partnerships, Personal Service Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 Va. Tax Rev.
57, 102 n.178 (1988).
115
Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957) (restricting use of a net operating loss
carryover after a statutory merger to the "same business" that generated the loss under a
"continuity of business enterprise" test.)
116
General Accounting Office, Tax Administration Recurring Issues in Tax Disputes Over
Business Expense Deductions (Sept. 27, 1995) (reporting that of 117 IRS Office of Appeals
cases filed by large corporations, capital expenditure issues comprise 42% ofthe total number
and $~.1 billion of the $1.9 billion in proposed tax adjustments), reprinted in GAO Identifies
Most Common Business Expense Deduction Issues Between IRS and Taxpayers, 95 Tax Notes
Today 189-39 (Sept. 27, 1995) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 95 TNT 189-39).
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Unlike many other big corporation capitalization issues,
however, four-year cyclical expenses seem to raise minimal
administrative problems for the Service or the taxpayer. An
Industry Specialization Program [hereinafter ISP] coordinated
issue paper (rather than merely listing as a "significant issue") 117
probably would pick up inost, if not all, of the cases in the airline
industry and, assuming Congress permits the establishment of
capitalization boundaries through audit and litigation to continue,
direct litigation costs would probably be minimal. 118 In general,
however, the Service might well follow the lead of courts that have
extended rough justice rules to large taxpayers. 119

The first step identifies a significant issue as widespread and complex. If a significant
issue remains significant and becomes more widespread, the industry specialist is involved
in the development of the significant issue into a coordinated issue paper. If the issue is
coordinated, an Industry Specialization Program [hereinafter ISP) coordinated issue paper
is written thus becoming the method by which the IRS examines the cases, procedures,
processes and techniques used to audit the particular issues. Deposition of IRS National
Director of Corporate Examinations Addresses FSA and ISP Programs (Nov. 29, 1994) 95 Tax
Notes Today 67-84 (Apr. 6, 1995) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 95 TNT 67-84).
John J. Monaco, Executive Director Coordinated Examination Programs, stated that
"significant issues" differ from ISP "coordinated issues" in that only the latter are governed
by precise mandatory guidelines; the former might develop into coordinated issues, but they
might not. John J. Monaco, Industry Specialization (ISP): Opportunities to Relieve Corporate
Tax Burden (Dec. 22, 1992), 92 Tax Notes Today 256-17 (Dec. 24, 1992) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit. 92 TNT 256-17).
118
Establishing tax rules through litigation is a risky and inefficient venture due to the
·plethora of fora and the tendency to establish an endless cycle of conflicting precedents. See
Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 5-6. Before the Service
embarks on litigating the tax treatment of cyclical airline repairs, however, it should consider
the special hazards of litigation here. House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer's
reported advice that the airline industry "may not be the most appropriate area in which the
Internal Revenue Service should be seeking to expand ... [INDOPCO]'s application," Sindhu
G. Hirani,Archer Urges IRS to Continue Deductions for Mandated Aircraft Safety Inspections,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Sept. 26, 1996, at G-7 could well be sound even beyond the simple hint
of a "limitation rider." Some court decisions reflect a tendency to distort doctrine to
ameliorate the hardships of economically distressed taxpayers or, perhaps more narrowly in
bankruptcy cases, to direct the few remaining assets to claims other than the Government's
newly assessed tax claims. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931);
Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). This tendency might be particularly
relevant in challenging some fmancially distressed members of the airline industry.
119
Courts fashioning simplifying rough justice rules have usually done so for larger
corporations-who else can afford to litigate these issues, particularly in refund suits? Cf
NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 296 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane) (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing a rough justice deduction under the since discredited (no) separate
asset doctrine for a large business' expansion costs because "[t)he taxpayer here, and others,
preeminently. banks, who will benefit from the decision of the en bane majority, can by no
means merit description as 'economically deprived.' The benefit heaped upon them further
117
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The rough justice exceptions to future benefit capitalization
provide immediate expensing for several categories: (1) costs with
de minimis (insubstantial) or short-lived benefit, (2) costs recurring
in a steady state, (3) costs with temporally limited benefit, but
lacking a depreciation deduction if capitalized, and (4) costs when
the burdens of capitalization/depreciation outweigh the benefit of
a more clear reflection of income. Although the rationale of the last
category underlies the other three, it supports an independent
category for those costs that can not come under the other three
categories, but where the capitalization of these costs is still moretrouble-than-it's-worth. Each of these rules are explored briefly
below and in greater detail in Rough Justice. 120

1. De Minimis or Short-Lived Benefit
Achieving rough justice under a minimum distortion of income
standard requires an exception from strict capitalization
requirements for items of relatively small cost and for items with
short-lived benefits. Items of insubstantial cost present no realistic
threat of a material distortion of income if they are expensed
immediately despite the presence offuture benefit. The courts 121
and Chief Counsel's Office 122 have approved the use of minimum
capitalization rules that permit taxpayers to deduct any
expenditures falling below a certain dollar threshold. 123 The
problem with this de minimis exception is determining what
amounts are insubstantial for a particular taxpayer for a particular
tax year. 124 At the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium Ken Kempson
suggested that the section 179 election to expense a set annual
amount ($17,500 to increase gradually to $25,000) could serve as a
model for an annual maximum deductible amount. We agree and
discuss the exceptions to future benefit capitalization as small
business provisions in Rough Justice.
contributes to the deserved description of our income tax system as a disgrace.").
120
See generally Rough Justice, supra note 16.
121
See Cincinnati, 424 F.2d 563.
22
l
See G.C.M. 34,959 (July 25, 1972).
123
See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
124
Compare Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 563 (finding $500 insubstantial), with Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 234 (1985) (finding $15,545 insubstantial).
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Expenditures with short-lived benefits require expensing in
order to match the expenditure with the current income it produces.
Generally, these expenditures are deducted immediately because
any future benefit is considered insubstantial in relation to current
income. 125 As with de minimis expenditures, the burden of
capitalizing and then amortizing items with short-lived benefit
outweighs the benefit of less income distortion that might be
possible under the capitalization method. 126

2. Steady State Recurring Costs
Current deductions for steady state recurring costs tend to
produce the same result on average that could be obtained by
capitalizing and depreciating these costs over their useful lives.
Steady state-fairly constant-costs that recur on a regular basis will
produce technical mismatching with the income they generate
when deducted currently; however, only minimal income distortion
occurs. Viewing each expenditure individually, they should be
deducted because a recurring expenditure typifies an ordinary
business expense under section 162 whereas capital expenditures
generally are extraordinary and non-recurring. 127 Furthermore,

See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1005 (permitting a current deduction
for stock warrants issued to a major customer to induce the purchase of workstations because
the benefit from long-term customer relationship was incidental in comparison to the
immediate benefit of the sale); Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57 (allowing immediate
deductions for most advertising costs despite their potential to generate future sales); Reg.
§ 1.162-6 (1958) ("Amounts currently paid or accrued for books, furniture, and professional
instruments and equipment, the useful life of which is short, may be deducted.").
126
See Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 527 (1976) (suggesting that a deduction of a
$25 licensing fee might be deductible), affd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 941 (1979); Southland Royalty Co. v. U.S., 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (useful life
of petroleum reserves survey subject to change at any time (due to effect of any nearby
petroleum pumping), which has to be updated every few years to take account of subsequent
developments. "In those circumstances, it is not compulsory to amortize such a rec111T4lg item
over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it appropriate to require capitalization without
amortization; such a requirement would clearly distort Southland's income.").
127
See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 217 (using the recurring and non-recurring
nature as "a very crude but perhaps serviceable demarcation between those capital
expenditures that can feasibly be capitalized and those that cannot be"); Cabintaxi Corp. v.
Commissioner, 63 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that selling expenses occur
continuously to justify an immediate deduction); Davee v. United States, 444 F.2d 557, 567
(Ct. Cl. 1971) (distinguishing start-up costs by their non-recurring nature from ordinary
expenses that recur regularly); T.A.M. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996) (finding the recurring nature
125
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considering the aggregate of the recurring expenditures, annual
current deductions will approximate the total depreciation that
otherwise would be taken in each benefited year. 128
The inherent difficulty with this approach is defining how often
the expenditures must recur to qualify for an immediate deduction.
On an individual basis, substantial authority supports expensing
costs recurring every one to three years-the classic example is
repainting a structure every three years. 129 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned in Moss v. Commissioner 130 that since costs of repainting
hotel rooms every three to five years would be currently deductible,
doubling up maintenance to paint two-thirds of the rooms in one
year to catch up on deferred maintenance was deductible as a
"minor variation" in the pattern of annual maintenance.
Conversely, costs recurring every_ five to ten years certainly seem
an important factor to consider in assessing capitalization); P.L.R. 92-36-021 (June 8, 1992)
(permitting current deductions for recurring short week benefits paid to laid-off employees).
128
See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 217; T.A.M. 96-38-002 (June 3, 1996);
Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 571-72 ("compared with total operating expenses, total depreciation
deductions claimed, or the total net income ... , the differences between depreciation the
deductions computed ... [under an expensing of $500 dollars or less and under capitalizing
and then depreciating such items] are so minute as to become unfathomable"); T.A.M. 96-45002 (June 21, 1996); Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 18-20.
In addition to the costs remaining in a steady state, the income or benefit ofthese costs must
also recur regularly. See Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 F.3d 799-(8th Cir. 1996)
(denying current deductions for steady state insurance premiums paid in anticipation of
employees' black lung disease claims because the premiums were building up a reserve to
meet a substantial future liability when the mine closed and the no longer employed miners
then filed black lung claims).
129
See, e.g., Estate of Wilbur v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 322, 327 n.6 (1964) (distinguishing
final coat of paint in construction from currently deductible.repainting, which usually recurs
no more frequently than every three years). Although the Service has required capitalization
of dredging costs incurred every three years in Revenue Rulilng 68-483, 1968-2 C.B. 91, some
in Chief Counsel only lukewarmly concurred and seemed to prefer an immediate deduction.
See G.C.M. 34,102 (Apr. 17, 1969).
[W]e fully realize that characterization of expenditures incurred in a silting removal
operation as either "expense" or a "capital improvement" is not free from doubt. Of
course we still feel that an expense characterization is the only proper classification
where complete redredging is accomplished on an annual basis. However, classification
becomes suspect where silt is removed every three years ... or one-third of the operation
is accomplished every year .... In either case, whether the removal of silt accumulated
during the prior three years benefits the current year or benefits the succeeding three
years conjures visions in legalistic semantics and often as not the barnyard may wear
an ·entirely different hue when interpretative chickens come home to roost. In either
event both sides of the coin have merit.
I d.
130

831 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987).
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under Wolfsen Land & Cattle to require capitalization. 131 These
generalities leave a gray area132 for cyclical costs incurred between
three and five years, such as airline maintenance costs incurred
every four years. The ultimate dividing line will take time to
develop. Amortization safe harbors would be much more
administrable. Notice 88-62 133 providing safe harbor "amortization"
of writer's prepublication costs at 50% I 25% I 25% over three years
is a useful model in general for amortization or depreciation of
irregularly recurring expenditures with substantial future benefits.
Aggregating all of a taxpayer's related costs on a year-by-year
basis may indicate that the costs recur annually. For example,
even though a taxpayer may repaint individual structures every
three years, when that taxpayer repaints a structure each year the
aggregate repainting costs recur annually. In most cases, the
annual costs will be roughly in a steady state and some variation
in amount should not preclude a current deduction. 134 Instead, the
current deductions will properly reflect income on a basis
commensurate with capitalization/depreciation135 without creating
unnecessary burdens to account for each expenditure
.
individually. 136

See Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. 1 (capitalizing the costs to repair drainage gates
every five years and redredging costs incurred every ten years; depreciation as a freestanding
intangible was then allowed over the recurrence interval). Beginning with the 1954 Code, a
congressional pattern has developed for providing a sixty-month amortization period for selfcreated intangible assets where case law did not readily provide a deduction or depreciation,
such as formation costs, see I.R.C. §§ 248, 709, and start-up costs. See I.R.C. § 195.
Purchased intangibles received a much longer amortization period of fifteen years due to paygo revenue neutrality constraints. See id. at§ 197.
132
See Official Gives Update on Series of Guidance on Tax Accounting Issues, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), Mar. 11, 1993, at G2-G3 ("As Wolfsen pointed out, if [done] ... every year, it would
have been deductible. But if you've waited four or five years, it's not ..I gotta draw the line.
I've got to say, 'If you do it every second year, you're fme. If you wait six years, it's not.'")
(quoting Assistant Chief Counsel Glenn Carrington).
133
1988-1 C.B. 548.
134
See Moss, 831 F.2d at 842 (holding that minor variations in expenditure patterns should
not drastically alter the tax consequences); T.A.M. 81-36-001 (Feb. 27, 1980) (finding
recurring costs when there are no "disproportionate changes"). But see T.A.M. 74-01-31-140A
(Jan. 31, 1974) (holding that sharp decreases indicate a non-recurring nature).
135
See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 215 ("[E]xpenses and receipts will be
systematically mismatched-but the same on average. Under these conditions the benefits
of capitalization are unlikely to exceed the accounting and other administrative costs entailed
in capitalization.").
136
Cf Cincinnati, 424 F.2d at 572 (considering a current deduction when the burden from
131
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3. Costs With Temporally Limited Benefit When Depreciation
Remains Unavailable
When a taxpayer's only options are a current deduction or
capitalization without · amortization for expenditures with
temporally limited benefits, a current deduction is preferable
because it creates less income distortion than capitalization without
depreciation. To assess the success of a method of accounting, the
analysis must first recognize that capitalization, depreciation, and
clear reflection of income are "inextricably intertwined."137 Income
distortion, therefore, occurs when capitalized costs cannot be
amortized to effectively match the expense with the associated
income. Income distortion also occurs when the costs are deducted
immediately but they provide benefits beyond the current period.
Given the choice between these two methods, a current deduction
is better because it produces less income distortion by at least
matching some of the expense with the revenue produced in the
current period-permanent capitalization never matches any
expense with revenue. 138 Both the courts 139 and the Service 140 have
allowed current deductions for this reason when faced with this
narrow choice.

!!apitalization "to account for each item of property separately is great") (emphasis added).
137
/d. at 569 (quoting Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967)).
138
See Gunn, supra note 53, at 492 ("In the absence of a feasible method of amortizing costs
... a current deduction may be preferable to capitalization as a method of clearly reflecting
income.").
139
See, e.g., Southland Royalty Co., 582 F.2d at 618 ("In those ~ircumstances, it is not
compulsory to amortize such a recurring item over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it
appropriate to require capitalization without amortization; such a requirement would clearly
distort Southland's income."). This rationale undoubtedly led courts to adopt the separate
saleable asset rule that permitted an immediate deduction when no separate, transferable
asset was created by an expenditure. See Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income,
supra note 53, at 51-57. By ad~pting this rule, courts could avoid the harsh result of
capitalizing non-amortizable expansion costs by claiming that no identifiable asset was
present. See supra note 53, at 51-57; see, e.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States,
505 F.2d 1185, 1192 (lOth Cir. 1974) ("The government suggests no way in which [the startup expenditures] could be amortized. The government's theoretical approach ... permits a
distortion of [the] taxpayer's financial situation.").
140
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (reversing a T.A.M. requiring the capitalization
of soil remediation costs, in part on the rationale that "since the land is not subject to an
allowance for depreciation, amortization, or depletion, the amounts expended to restore the
land to its original condition are not subject to capitalization").
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Unfortunately, this ali-or-nothing dichotomy ignores the more
desirable option of capitalizing the costs as a freestanding asset and
amortizing that asset over its usefullife. 141 Instead of settling for
one of the two options that distort income, several courts have
pursued this alternative concept that once again attempts to match
expenses with related income. 142 For example, in Wolfsen Land &
Cattle, 143 Judge Sterrett capitalized the costs incurred to maintain
a drainage system as a freestanding asset depreciable over the tenyear period until the next anticipated maintenance operation
(where the repair cycle was five years, the court adopted a five-year
amortization period). 144 This approach relieved the pressure to
currently deduct a substantial expenditure or to capitalize the costs
to the land, a non-depreciable asset. The focus, therefore, should
remain on how the costs can be treated to avoid income distortion
without placing undue· emphasis on capitalizing the costs to a
particular asset. 145

4. More-Trouble-Than-It's- Worth
The final rough justice rule encompasses any situation where the
burdens of pursuing capitalization outweigh any potential benefit
obtained from this method's more clear reflection of income.
Although intertwined throughout the previous three rough justice
rules, this notion justifies a current deduction for any expenditures
that do not fall within the specific limits outlined above, but where

See Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 32-38; Gunn, supra
note 53, at 445-46.
142
See, e.g., NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 954-55, 962-63.
141

143

72 T.C. 1.

See id. at 13.
145
For example, in reconsidering a T.A.M. that required the capitalization of soil
remediation costs, see T.A.M. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992), the Service concluded that a current
deduction was preferable to capitalizing the costs to the non-depreciable land. See Rev. Rul.
94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. Unfortunately, this approach focused too heavily on the land without
considering the costs as a freestanding depreciable asset. See Juliann Avakian-Martin &
Marlis Carson, Environmental Cleanup Issue: A Repeating Theme at ABA Meeting, 60 Tax
Notes 925, 927 (Aug. 16, 1993) ("[I)fthe costs ... in that T.A.M. should be capitalized, they
should be capitalized to the land. The IRS was trying to be 'nice' in reaching the conclusion
that costs were not capitalized ... yet the IRS still was criticized.") (quoting Treasury official
Robert Kilinskis).
144
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"the benefits of capitalization are unlikely to exceed the accounting
and other administrative costs entailed in capitalization."146
The benefits of capitalization may be analyzed on several levels~
First, by its ability to match _expenses with related revenue,
capitalization may obtain a more accurate reflection of income than
other accounting methods. Second, by treating alike all costs
benefiting several tax years, capitalization satisfies the goal of
horizontal equity. This effectively assures that the tax system
remains neutral and encourages economic efficiency by avoiding a
taxpayer preference for immediately deductible items over similar
items that require capitalization-Judge Richard Posner's good
point in Fishman v. Commissioner. 147 Third, capitalization might
yield more revenue to the Treasury than expensing. Following the
tax policy of adequacy of revenues, capitalization must be a
preferred method of accounting if expensing threatens to
significantly decrease tax revenues. 148 For a given expenditure, the
dollar amount of tax deductions would remain the same under both
capitalization with depreciation and expensing. The immediate
deduction from expensing, however, would decrease tax revenues
in present value terms in comparison to the spreading of the
deductions over a period of years.
Similarly, the burdens of capitalization can be analyzed on
several levels.
First, considering only the taxpayers,
administrative burdens· are at their greatest for small taxpayers for
whom record keeping is difficult. Many small taxpayers lack the
ability to track their expenditures and accurately depreciate the
capitalized amounts over their useful lives. Second, considering
both the Service and the taxpayers, the administrative burdens
increase when frequent disputes arise during audits and litigation.
For example, if litigation typically is required to resolve disputes
over useful life estimations, then the costs of capitalization

146

Encyclopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 215.
837 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir. 1988).
148
See Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 567,
569-72 (1965); Edward Yorio, The President's Tax Proposals: A Major Step in the Right·
Direction, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1255, 1263 (1985) ("In its narrower sense, the adequacy
criterion refers to the aggregate revenue effect .... If a proposed change in the Internal
Revenue Code will result in a significant loss in revenues, the criterion is badly served. If the
proposal will generate additional revenues, the criterion is satisfied.") (footnotes omitted).
147
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increase. Minimizing these administrative burdens would help to
satisfy the tax policy of simplicity in the tax system. 149 In the
ultimate assessment of whether capitalization is more-troublethan-it's-worth, the revenue benefits must exceed th.e increase in
administrative burdens.
Together, these four rough justice rules provide effective means
for discerning the exceptions to the otherwise harsh rule of future
benefit requires capitalization. Their application avoids a material
distortion ofincome and supplies a degree offairness to the· system
with simple rules that produce the "right" result on average. In
sacrificing theoretical purity, these rules allow taxpayersparticularly small taxpayers-to clearly reflect income without
incurring any undue burdens.

C. Structured Discretionary Justice Regulations
As developed more thoroughly in Rough Justice, 150 these rough
justice rules should be incorporated into structured discretionary
justice regulations. Administrative guidance normally consists of
general standards, detailed rules, examples and conclusions, or
some combination of these features. General standards set forth
the principle or policy of the substantive law-such as the clear
reflection of income standard in taxation-that enables a
decisionmaker to assess whether the facts of a particular situation
merit the desired treatment, i.e., discretionary justice. 151
Conversely, rules are definitional and can generate precise and
predictable answers. 152 These two approaches are not mutually
exclusive; often "safe harbor" rules are combined with a facts-andcircumstances test subjected to the underlying standard. This
combination format provides certainty in the safe harbor for anyone
See Sneed, supra note 148, at 572-7 4 (describing this goal as "practicality"); Yorio, supra
note 148, at 1256-57 ("Like the [taxpayers') costs of compliance and planning, the
govemment's expense in administering the law produces no efficiency gains: What the
govemment gains from a successful audit or lawsuit, the taxpayer loses.").
150
See generally Rough Justice, supra note 16 (exploring this notion more thoroughly in
response to the IRS request for comments on the need and nature of guidance for
capitalization issues).
151
See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L.
Rev. 1685, 1688 (1976).
152
See id. at 1687-88.
149
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who can read the Code and "an area for those who want to venture
into it where, if you really understand the cases, you can advise
your client intelligently."153 Such a combination of safe harbor and
fact-and-circumstances permits too much abuse by generally high
income taxpayers, however, and is now disfavored. 154 The better
combination is to provide rules for implementing the standard and
directions for applying such rules. Expanding on Professor Daniel
Shaviro's illustration of rules and standards with speed limits, 155 (1)
a rule would be, "do not exceed 65 miles per hour"; (2) a standard
would be, "do not exceed a safe speed under the circumstances"; and
(3) structured discretionary justice would additionally provide
factors to use in determining safe speed, e.g., (a) time of day or
night or dusk; (b) weather conditions; (c) condition of highway; (d)
condition of car; (d) skill/training of driver; (e) distractions-radio,
eating, cellular phone; and (D prior accident or speeding records,
and how to weigh and apply combinations of these factors.
Ideally, the evolution of regulations incorporating structured
discretionary justice progresses from: first, considering one fact
pattern at a time without announcing generalized principles;
second, fashioning the generalized principle or standard based on
this prior experience; and third, formulating regulations that
incorporate the generalized standard and implementing balancing
rules, consistent with that standard, for achieving some certainty
and structured discretionary justice. 156
In the capitalization area, the doctrine is sufficiently evolved to
promulgate structured discretionary justice regulations. These
regulations should set forth the general principle of a minimum
distortion of income through the timing of deductions. In addition,
they should contain a presumption of capitalization when the
expenditure provides future benefit along with the rough justice
153

Income Tax Revisions: Panel Discussions Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
86th Cong., 883 (1959) (colloquy between Chairman Wilbur Mills, D-Ark., and Hugh Calkins,
Esq.).
154
Cf Business Plan 1992, reprinted in Treasury-IRS Business Plan, 92 Tax Notes Today
104-50 (May 18, 1992) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 92 TNT 104-50).
155
Daniel N. Shaviro, Compliance and Enforcement under the Passive Loss Regulations, 4
Tax Mgmt. Real Est. J. 107 (May 1988); accord, Lee A. Sheppard, Kohl Discusses Forthcoming
Guidance, Anti-Abuse Rules, 73 Tax Notes 399 (Oct. 28, 1996) (Kohl uses similar speed limit
metaphor).
156
See Davis, supra note 35, at 60.
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exceptions for de minimis or short-lived benefits and recurring
expenditures. Furthermore, a safe harbor amortization period
should be provided for taxpayers with expenditures of temporally
limited benefit when amortization otherwise is unavailable.
Reasonable approximations ofthe expenditures' useful lives would
provide necessary relief from the otherwise harsh treatment of
permanent capitalization. Thus, the regulations would provide safe
harbors based on prior ruling and case law experience. In addition,
they would supply the general principle behind capitalization for
discretionary determinations of facts that fall outside the safe
harbor provisions.

III.

CYCLICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE COSTS

A. Conclusions ofthe Aircraft Maintenance T.A.M.
The airline in the T.A.M. currently deducted the costs of major
engine inspections and complete overhauls performed
approximately every four years on its aircraft fleet used in its
passenger and freight transport business. 157 Each major inspection
cost between $90,000 and $122,000, equivalent to 1/10 the cost of
a new engine and 1/100 the cost of a new aircraft. 158 A properly
serviced engine had an estimated service life in excess of twentytwo years. 159
The T.A.M. required the airline to capitalize these inspection
costs and depreciate them as seven-year recovery property. 16° Chief
Counsel commenced its analysis with the conceptually sound notion
of using capitalization to achieve a more accurate calculation of net
income by matching expenses with related income. 161
Acknowledging that the demarcations between current expenses
and capital expenditures are those of degree and not kind, the
. T.A.M. rested on the INDOPCO precept that the duration and
extent of any future benefits are important considerations in

157

158
159

160
161

See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

1997]

Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs

203

determining the appropriateness of expense or capitalization
treatment. 162 The T.A.M. concluded that the costs of major engine
inspections were capital expenditures because they
result in substantial improvements to the overall condition of the
engine that are not merely incidental and ... have the effect of
adding materially to the then value of the engine while at the
same time prolonging the engine's useful life. Furthermore,
these expenditures generate significant future benefits to [the
airline], not the least of which is the fact that without them, the
FAA would not permit [the airline] to continue to operate its
aircraft. Finally, in the case of engines owned by [the airline],
the major inspection costs restore exhaustion for which an
allowance has been made. 163

Once capitalized, the costs were recoverable through depreciation
over the recovery period of the aircraft. 164
Ken Kempson, former aide to Chief Counsel Brown, explained at
the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium that in fact T.A.M.'s are quite
taxpayer specific due (a) to the facts of the particular taxpayer's
case, and (b), often more importantly, to the presentation to the
Service of those facts. Ken first illustrated this concept with the
example of the well-publicized Danaher Corp./Just-in-Time
T.A.M. 165 That T.A.M. tumed on the taxpayer's internal
communications lauding the retraining and restructuring as a new
162
See id. Unfortunately, this precept seems to lead agents to presume capitalization
whenever an expenditure is expected to produce future benefits, whether "substantial" or
"incidental." In part this is because, as yet, "incidental" is more of a conclusion than a test.
163
Id. The taxpayer argued that the expenditures "merely restored the aircraft to the
operating condition that was required by the FAA," id., to come within the before-the-need
vs. after-the-repair test of Plainfield-Union Water Co. u. Commissioner. 39 T.C. 333 (1962).
That case used a before-the-condition and after-the-repair comparison of property values to
determine if the expenditure constituted an incidental repair. See id. at 338 (''The proper test
is whether the expenditure materially enhances the value, use, life expectancy, strength, or
capacity as compared with the status of the asset prior to the condition necessitating the
expenditure."). The T.A.M. rejected this contention for a number of reasons, the most
significant being the ability to distinguish the aircraft maintenance from the sudden
casualty-like occurrence of the condition necessitating a repair in Plainfield-Union. See
T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996).
164
See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996).
165
T .A.M. 95-44-001 (July 21, 1995). See Matthew A. Melone, The Information Revolution:
Organizational Knowledge and the Capital Expenditure Question, 50 Tax Law. 73, 87-88
(1996).
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way of doing business. The taxpayer's counsel initially thought that
current deductibility of such costs was self-evident and easily
defensible. Only after the adverse T.A.M. did the taxpayer more
carefully marshal its facts. Then it reportedly settled the case quite
favorably. 166 Expressly based upon communications with taxpayer
counsel and other non-governmental sources and not upon any
knowledge from his stint with Chief Counsel, Ken suggested that
such might be the case as well with the cyclical aircraft engine
safety inspections. He pointed out that in many cases the actual
replacement of parts is a minor part of the inspection costs. Most
of the costs could involve taking the engine out of the aircraft,
replacing it with a rotable engine, and then taking apart and
putting back together the engine first taken out. Thus on the
specific facts presented by another taxpayer, the T.A.M.'s
conclusion of material increase in value through replacement of
parts might not be readily replicated.
Ken offered at the VTSG meeting the above analysis as a
possible explanation of Chief Counsel Brown's written statement to
Chairman Archer that the cyclical aircraft engine safety inspection
T .A.M. was taxpayer specific and not a precedent. Whether
revenue agents rely upon the safety inspection T.A.M. itself is a red
herring. More importantly such inspections are included on the
"significant issues list," thus advising agents to question their tax
treatment. 167 Unlike an Industry Specialization Paper, however,
the agent's resolution of the issue is not dictated by the National

166

Business Expenses, NAM Asks IRS to Reconsider Ruling on Just-In- Time Manufacturing
Techniques, Daily Tax Report (BNA), Jan. 25, 1996, at G-6; McCormally, supra note 72, at
798 ("following the issuance of the T.A.M. a settlement was negotiated in the case that was
almost wholly satisfactory to the taxpayer: not only were the just-in-time manufacturing
training expenditures involved in the case determined to be currently deductible (or
amortizable over a relatively short time frame), but it was agreed that the taxpayer's ongoing
expenditures for training could be currently deducted as ordinary and necessary business
expenses"); Laura Saunders, How to fight the IRS, Forbes, Jan. 22, 1996, at 64 (compromise
was to amortize $9 million training costs over five years instead of eight); Albert B.
Crenshaw, IRS Rules Against Danaher On One-Time Tax Write-Off; Conversion Decision
Could Affect Other Firms, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1995, at D1 ("The company sought to deduct
four kinds of expenses associated with just-in-time manufacturing: reconfiguring the plant
physically, buying materials and supplies used in the process, training workers and hiring
consultants. Drawing on Danaher's assessment that just-in-time manufacturing is a 'radical
redesign, a fundamental change in the business processes' at factories and that it provides
long-term benefits to Danaher, the agency concluded that all the costs must be capitalized.").
167
See supra note 19.
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Office. 168 This article advises that if the Service concludes that
four-year amortization as a freestanding intangible is the proper
tax treatment, such conclusion be stated in an ISP or betterpublished ruling pending consideration in a negotiated regulation
process.

B. Public Choice Theory and Interpretation: Congressionally
Sanctioned Subsidy?
Chairman Archer's criticism of the cyclical aircraft maintenance
costs T.A.M. based on the increase in the effective rate of taxation
for airlines apparently flows from his opposition to any tax
increase. 169 His opposition follows the tax policy factor of economic
growthP0 "The criterion of economic growth insists ... that rates
of marginal taxation not be confiscatory. Otherwise, significant
numbers of taxpayers may lose their incentive to work and to take
entrepreneurial risks."171 For airlines, the case has not been made
that a decrease in their net after-tax income would decrease their
growth. The growth potential depends primarily on the intended
use of this income: plant and equipment investment, rank-and-file
compensation, debt reduction, dividend payment or top executive
incentives. 172 In particular, any effective increase in taxation will
not discourage compliance with FAA safety standards; similarly,
tax favored treatment would not encourage compliance. For the
airline industry will meet FAA requirements regardless of the tax
laws. Any tax preference for airlines-providing a deduction even
168

See supra note 117.
See generally supra note 23.
170
See Sneed, supra note 148, at 586-90; see supra note 12.
171
Yorio, supra note 148, at 1262.
172
It seems likely that income is more likely to be spent on executive compensation than
increased safety measures. Consider the record of corporate downsizing coupled with soaring
executive pay and increasing income disparity. See, e.g., Steven Pearlstein, Reshaped
Economy Exacts Tough Toll; Competition, Efficiency Grow-as Does Americans' Income
Disparity, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1995, at A1; Judith H. Dobrzynski, New Road to Riches is
Paved with Options, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1997, at 3-1 (noting that while average worker got
a "meager 3.3 percent raise in 1996," top executives again enjoyed double-digit raises often
approaching 20 percent due to stock options although corporate profits increased only 11
percent); Roger Lowenstein, On the Difficulty of Hiring Good Help, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1997,
at C1; Michael J. McCarthy, Thanks a Lot: CEO Gets $102 Million Bonus, Wall St. J., Mar.
27, 1997, at B-1.
169
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when general expense/capitalization rules require capitalizationwould provide a subsidy to do what they would do anyway rather
than an incentive to do what they otherwise would not do. If an
intended subsidy exists, it must be derived from the general tax
laws because the statutes do not provide an explicit subsidy.
Classic public choice theory views some legislation as a private
contract between legislators bent on reelection and private interest
or pressure groups. 173 "Public choice [is] the economic study of

See Frederick R. Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status of the Administrative
Agencies, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 277, 284 (1987) (explaining that the "democratic process ideal
presumes the value of interest group competition and representation in the political process");
Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 Cardozo
L. Rev. 601, 645-48 (1993) (discussing the interaction of interest groups and govemment);
Emest Gellhom, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale L.J. 359, 377
(1972) (explaining how public interest groups have "drawn agency attention to new
techniques for fulfilling their mandate"); Mark R. Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval? The
Role of the President in the Creation of Legislative History, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 239, 248 (1995)
(discussing the impact of a lawyer-lobbyist on legislative history); Jonathan R. Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 224 (1986) (explaining the "so-called interest group ... theory
oflegislation" which contends that "market forces provide strong incentives for politicians to
enact laws that serve private rather than public interests, and hence statutes are supplied
by lawmakers to the political groups or coalitions that outbid competing groups"); Richard A.
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 193 (1986) (stressing the impact of special interest
groups in shaping legislation); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process,
77 Cal. L. Rev. 919, 921-22 (1989) (book review) (discussing the view of the "legislative
process as a continuous series of bargains among competing interest groups"); Jeffrey A.
Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for
Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 221, 248-49 (1995) (pointing to the
impact of special interest groups on the distribution of wealth); David A. Strauss, Presidential
Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 126 n.24 (1993) (describing the
"pluralist model of democracy" as a system "under which optimal outcomes are thought to be
produced by the competition among interest groups"); John Vitha, Comment, Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, West Virginia: The Supreme
Court Gives "Welcome Stranger" Tax Assessments a Cold Reception, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 1383,
1407 (1991) (discussing judicial review of laws enacted by constitutional referendum or
supported by grassroots organizations); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public
Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102
Yale L.J. 1165, 1171-84 (1993) ("Public choice analysis ... reinforces Madison's preference
for competitive political processes that pit diverse and conflicting groups against one
another.").
Commentators have criticized interest group competition as leading to economic waste.
See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 707, 737 (1991) (criticizing the notion that "legislation enacted by a
representative body is ... more likely to realize 'the common good"'); Douglas M. Branson, A
Corporate Paleontologist's Look at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit, 65 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 745, 753 (1989); Dennis Honabach & Roger J. Dennis, TheSeventh Circuit and the
Market for Corporate Control, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 681, 725-28 (1989) (explaining how the
173

1997]

Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs

207

nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics
to political science."174 Without debating the accuracy of this
theory's tenets as to the origin oflegislation, 175 the following rules
of statutory construction derived from public choice scholarship are
supported by various judicial and administrative tax rulings. First,
when the special interest groups and Congress act against a
backdrop of reserved judicial or agency power, that power should be
applied broadly. 176 In the tax arena, the clear reflection of income
is such a power reserved to the judiciary and the Service. Second,
when the fact finder can determine that a particular provision is
the product of private compromise that produces asymmetrical
benefits between taxpayer groups, the terms of the statutory
"contract" or "devil's bargain" should not be extended to other
taxpayers or tax provisions. 177 Taxpayers are entitled to the
preferences Congress awards by relying on form even when little or

'"interest group' approach . . . views legislation as the product of compromise among
competing interest groups" and arguing that the court's role should be to enforce the bargain
struck between the interest groups as reflected in the legislation); Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 123, 132
(1989) (discussing the history of interest group involvement in agency and noting that critics
have seen interest groups as "pursuing their own ends").
Other commentators criticize such competition as preserving the status quo. See Ethan
Fishman, Loper, Begging and Civic Virtue, 46 Ala. L. Rev. 783, 794-95 (1995) ("When civic
virtue is defined by competing interest groups, it becomes possible for cohesive minority
interests to have a disproportionate influence on public policy.").
174
Dennis C. Mueller, Public choice Ill (1989 rev.).
175
In studying this issue, Professors Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey reached several
conclusions about public choice theory. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873 (1987). First, "[a]lthough it is true that
legislators are influenced by special interests, and that legislatures are faced with the
possibility of incoherence, legislatures need not be mere pawns of special interest, nor are
they doomed to chaos." I d. at 883. Second, "the behavior of members of Congress is dictated
by three basic goals: achieving reelection, gaining influence within the House, and making
good public policy." ld. at 889. Third, "[t)he economic theory of legislation ... does not
perform well empirically." I d. at 895. Fourth, "[o)ur best view of the political process ... is
a mixed model in which constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all
influence legislative conduct." ld. at 900. "In addition, ... political parties and chief
executives, among other forces, also influence outcomes." ld. at 900 n.165. These other forces
influencing legislation include the popular press, in particular investigative tax reporting.
176
Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Fore ward: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L.
Rev. 4, 50-51 (1984).
177
See Easterbrook, supra note 176, at 46, 50. Judge Easterbrook posits that the "more
detailed the law, the more evidence of interest-group compromise and therefore the less
liberty judges possess." See supra note 176, at 16. See also Honabach & Dennis, supra note
173.
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no economic substance exists apart from the tax preferenceP8 The
taxpayers, however, can expect no more. 179 Third, when the fact
finder determines that a provision does not originate from special
interest but rather public interest, a classic Holmesian fill-in-thegaps-by-analogy analysis should be used when Congress failed to
address an item. 180 Well-known disparate tax doctrines appear
implicitly bottomed on this common sense construct. 181
The subsidy intended by Congress in the expensing/
capitalization area is the cost recovery deductions through
depreciation under section 168. Although theoretically enacted to
represent the exhaustion or decline in value, depreciation-in
particular accelerated depreciation-serves as an investment
incentive in addition to its representation of wear and tear. 182
Thus, taxpayers that meet the congressional objective of making an
investment can receive this subsidy regardless of any actual
exhaustion or decrease in value; taxpayers that meet the terms of
the statutory contract are entitled to a depreciation deduction
despite the lack of economic substance. For example, in Liddle v.

178

Ironically, essentially this approach to statutory construction was followed by the Board
of Tax Appeals in Gregory u. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932), reu'd, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.
1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). The trial court upheld a transaction meeting the letter of
the newly revamped reorganization statute. 27 B.T.A. at 225. The appellate courts
adumbrated that the transaction still failed to meet the spirit of the law. See Rough Justice,
supra note 16.
179
See Easterbrook, supra note 176, at 54 ("[Courts should) look for and enforce the
bargain, but do not elaborate.").
180
Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 176, at 50.
181
These notio118, albeit unarticulated, underlie the Tax Co.urt's "statutory tax shelter" as
contrasted with "generic tax shelter" doctrine (articulated in Rose u. Commissioner, 88 T.C.
386 (1987), affd on other grounds, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989)). For an excellent discussion
ofthe "generic tax shelter" test, see Note, The Tax Court's Rose Test: More Thorns in the Sides
of Taxpayers, 8 Va. Tax Rev. 905 (1989). Similarly the ability of a taxpayer to form a tax
entity just to obtain the tax benefits Congress intended that such entity could provide, such
as Subchapter S status or Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation status or corporate
qualified retirement benefits prior to 1982 rests on these ideas. A similar policy of enforcing
congressionally intended special interest subsidy underlies certain administrative practices.
E.g., Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B. 112, considered in G.C.M. 38,117 (Sept. 28, 1979),
discussed at infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
182
This discrepancy with the theoretical basis is apparent in the statutory recovery periods
of section 168 that are often much shorter than the actual useful life. For example, as
personal property, a newly acquired aircraft engine is classified as seven-year property even
though with proper maintenance its useful life approximates twenty-two years. I.R.C. § 168.
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Commissioner, 183 the Third Circuit permitted a musician to
depreciate an antique musical instrument as theoretically subject
to wear and tear even though the antique possessed an
indeterminate useful life and non-diminishing value. 184 Under the
public choice doctrine, taxpayers that make the investment are
entitled to the subsidy regardless of the economic results. 185
Congressional modifications of this basic depreciation provision
were fairly restricted and left expenditures for aircraft engine
overhauls to case law doctrines. Over the past fifteen years,
Congress carved out, wherever possible, self-created intangible
assets from the basic depreciation provisions via sections 195, 197,
and 263A. These exceptions are quite specific and cannot be
judicially expanded to cover other expenditures not enumerated in
the statutes. Therefore, Congress presumably left the treatment of
overhaul costs to the case law doctrine of achieving a clear
reflection of income. Nothing in the statutes indicates that
Congress intended to provide the airline industry with preferential
treatment beyond the accelerated depreciation allowed under
section 168. This conclusion seems reasonable given that most
likely neither Congress nor the FAA took account of any tax policies
when establishing the safety rules. The result might have differed
if Congress or the FAA established a policy assuming certain tax
consequences. But here the tax and safety policies appear
183

65 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 1995).
See id. at 335; cf Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); A.O.D. CC-1996-009
(July 15, 1996); Joseph M. Dodge & Deborah A. Geier, Simon Says: A Liddle Night Music
With Those Depreciation Deductions, Please, 69 Tax Notes 617 (Oct. 30, 1995); Lee Sheppard,
Violins, Ferraris, and the Music of Class Lives, 69 Tax Notes 669 (Nov. 6, 1995); Note, Which
Concept of Depreciation Should Guide Us? Trying to Develop a Consistent Framework for the
Federal Income Tax System, 14 Va. Tax Rev. 753 (1995).
185
Several references in the T.A.M. hint that capitalization might be required under some
sort of tax benefiUrecapture notion to restore the depreciation deductions previously taken.
See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996) ("[The) major engine inspections have the effect of
replacing the engine that was previously wasted during [the airline's] previous operations.");
cf G.C.M. 34,959 (July 25, 1972); G.C.M. 39,162 (Mar. 2, 1984). After Hillsboro Nat'l Bank
v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), however, the "fundamentally inconsistent event" test
is not triggered in a subsequent year when the initial deduction effectuated the purpose
Congress intended. See generally John W. Lee & Mark S. Bader, Contingent Income Items
and Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions: Correlative Adjustments and Clearer Reflection of
Income, 12 J. Corp. L. 137, 199-206 (1987); see also Rev. Rul. 85-186, 198.5-2 C.B. 84; T.A.M.
92-06-004 (Oct. 16, 1991). Thus, the airline was entitled to the depreciation subsidy initially
by satisfying the congressional purpose of making an investment, and the character of
subsequent expenditures for overhauls should not represent a recapture of that subsidy.
184
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independent. With the lack of a subsidy entitlement, the airlines
must satisfy one of the rough justice rules to obtain an immediate
deduction.

C. Application of the Rough Justice Rules to Cyclical
Aircraft Maintenance Costs
Assuming arguendo that the rough justice rules apply to large
taxpayers, 186 the conclusion that future benefit automatically leads
to capitalization must be reconsidered. One of the exceptions
outlined above might provide a justification for reversing the
T.A.M.'s conclusions.

1. De Minimis or Short-Lived Benefit
Although the approximately $90,000 to $120,000 cost of an
overhaul may not seem de minimis, a current deduction might be
justified by a minimal distortion of income standard. 187 Judge
Sterrett suggested in Wolfsen Land & Cattle that the absolute
amount of an expenditure may require capitalization. 188 As a
comparative standard, Congress carefully limited the statutory
equivalent of de minimis deductions to $17,500 (to gradually
increase to $25,000) 189 in section 179. 190 Thus, the relatively large

186

See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate scope of the
rough justice rules in the context of amount of taxpayer's income).
187
This article does not consider the repair doctrine that permits a current deduction for
incidental repairs because repair cases should be decided on the preferred distortion of
income basis-it's not a question of classifying an expenditure as a repair, the question is:
Does it distort income to currently deduct the expenditure? See Gunn, supra note 53, at 45761.
.
188

See Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13. The Service appears to waiver on this point.
Compare T.A.M. 94-24-002 (Feb. 9, 1994) (denying a repair deduction due to the
substantiality of nearly $1 billion spent for temporary work performed to raise oil rig
platforms and to construct a barrier wall around a storage tank), with Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1
C.B. 35 (permitting a deduction of presumably substantial soil remediation expenditures).
The aircraft maintenance costs, however, seem to greatly exceed the de minimis standard
when compared with Chief Counsel's prior recommendation of a $100 de minimis safe harbor.
See G.C.M. 34,959 (July 25, 1972).
189
See Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1111(a), 110 Stat. 1755, 1758 (1996).
190
See I.R.C. § 179(b)(l). In more recent years, Congress has found itself "paying" for any
extensions of tax expenditures, see supra note 25, suggesting that any de minimis-flavored
exception in the $90,000 to $120,000 range is probably not viable in today's economic and
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amount of these expenditures tends not to suggest a de minimis
characterization. Ken Kempson, at the VTSG Spring 1997
Symposium, flatly rejected any notion that the magnitude of an
expenditure militated towards capitalization, although recognizing
that a case could be made for a minimum expensing rule.
The inspection costs, however, might not distort income if
deducted as incidental repairs under a generally applicable repair
ratio. The T.A.M. reveals that these costs amount to about 1/10 the
cost of a new engine and 11100 the cost of a new airplane. 191
Restated as ratios, these costs seem much less substantial.
Although never formally adopted, the Chief Counsel's Office once
· proposed a safe harbor deduction for cyclical repair expenditures
that fell below 50% of the original cost of an asset. 192 Providing
taxpayers with a generalized repair ratio would satisfy the goal of
minimal distortion of income through rough justice rules-the ratio
achieves simplification and horizontal equity by providing one
straightforward rule for all taxpayers. Accordingly, further
consideration of a ~afe harbor repair ratio seems warranted. 193
Nevertheless, the fairly small ratio of aircraft maintenance costs to
initial investment makes the absolute cost more credible as a de
minimis amount. Given the ambiguous conclusions from the
absolute amount and the repair ratio, the proper tax treatment of
the cyclical maintenance costs may be too close to call on this one
factor alone.

2. Steady State Recurring Costs
The fact that these maintenance costs recur in approximately
four-year cycles places them right on the line between deductible
and capitalizable expenditures. As noted above, precedent
indicates that three-year-or-less cycles often provide deductions
whereas five-year-or-longer cycles require capitalization and

political climate.
191
See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996).
192
See G.C.M. 34,921 (June 26, 1972) (denying a deduction for railroad car rehabilitations
that often exceeded 50% of the original cost). ·
193
See Notice 96-7, 1996-1 C.B. 359 (requesting comments on guidance needed for
capitalization issues).
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depreciation. 194 Individually, each engine is inspected every four
years. A four-year period might just push the envelope enough that
it begins to tear. Although somewhat inconclusive, viewing the
inspection performed on each engine on an individual basis may
suggest capitalization. Aggregating the costs on a year-by-year
basis, however, indicates that the costs recur annually, which
supports a deduction. In particular, the airline probably overhauls
25% ofits fleet on a rotating basis each year. 195 With these steady
state recurring costs, there would appear to be little difference in
the measurement of income between expensing and
capitalizing/depreciating these expenditures. 196 Once again, under
the rough justice rules, it is a close call in deciding whether to
consider the individual or aggregate bases.

3. Costs With Temporally Limited Benefit When Depreciation
Remains Unavailable
An extensive analysis under the third rough justice rule should
be unnecessary. The need to perform the inspections every four
years in accordance with the FAA's safety requirements
demonstrates that these expenditures provide temporally limited
benefits. In addition, the T.A.M. itself states that these costs are

See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
To minimize the downtime of serviced aircraft, airlines often simply replace the
inspected engine with one of their "rotable engines" kept on hand in a pool. For a discussion
of the use of rotable parts, see generally Dennis J. Gaffney, Ratable Spare Parts: How Did a
"Terrible" Accounting Method Become So Bad?, 70 Tax Notes 1009 (Feb. 19, 1996); Calvin H.
Johnson, Federal Circuit Plays Dirty Pool with Inventory Accounting, 70 Tax Notes 111 (Jan.
1, 1996): W. Eugene Seago, Ratable Parts: IRS Discretion Under the Clear Reflection of Income
Standard, 67 Tax Notes 117 (Apr. 3, 1995). The removed engine is overhauled and placed
into the rotable parts pool and depreciated under Revenue Rulling 69-200, 1969-1 C.B. 60.
Smaller airlines might purchase or lease reconditioned engines from a reconditioning center
and send the inspected engine back to that center. The T.A.M. hints at a mixture of both
patterns. It states that the airline, "[i]n performing a major inspection, ... is required to
remove a large portion of engine component parts and replace these parts with new or
reconditioned parts." T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996). In addition, "a newly inspected
engine ... is of an interchangeable nature, and is treated by [the airline] as a substitute or
standby component." Id.
196
Cf Encylopaedia Britannica, 685 F.2d at 217 (considering recurring payments by a
publisher to authors developing books). With the current industry practice of immediately
expensing the costs, any.distortion normally created by the transition period to a steady state
will be absent in this situation.
194
195
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recoverable through depreciation. 197 Therefore, minimal distortion
of income should occur because the expenditures will be allocated
through depreciation to future benefited periods to achieve
matching. This is not a situation where this rough justice exception
is intended to apply (i.e., for expenditures capitalized, but nonrecoverable through depreciation despite the temporally limited
usefulness ofthe expenditures).
This rough justice rule may apply, however, due to the long
depreciation period suggested by the T.A.M. The T.A.M. capitalized
the costs of the overhauls to the engines that will generate
depreciation deductions over the next eight years. 198 Common
sense says that depreciating a cost that recurs every four years,
over eight tax years, is wrong. Particularly in the capitalization ·
area, unreasonable approaches tend to backfire by provoking courts
to apply roughjustice solutions. 199 Iflitigated, a court may perceive
the eight-year recovery period as "overreaching" by the Service, 200
and the court simply may allow a current deduction for the
expenditure. 201 The key to avoiding this result is achieving a.clear
reflection of income by capitalizing the costs to the right "asset."202

197

See T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996).

See id.; W ald, supra note 7.
See Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 52,-56 (discussing
courts' willingness to adopt the separate, saleable asset doctrine to alleviate the harshness
of capitalization in response to perceived overreaching by the Service).
200
NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 959 ("It was, in short, an attempted overreaching by the tax
collector. If he failed, he had less basis for protest than if he had confined his demands to
those which were properly Caesar's.").
201
See Capitalization Rules, supra note 16, at 677. For instance, the Ninth Circuit in Moss,
831 F.2d 833, allowed a taxpayer operating a hotel a current deduction for the recurring costs
of interior painting andre-papering of hotel rooms customarily redone on a three-year cycle.
Id. at 841-42. Using the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine, see infra note 200, the
Service sought to add the costs to the depreciable basis of the hotel building that had a
remaining useful life of thirty years. Moss, 831 F.2d at 835. Ironically, the Service permitted
the taxpayer to depreciate over seven years the costs of remodeling, beds, and drapes, see id.,
that probably had longer useful lives than the repainting. The court permitted an immediate
deduction for the repainting costs to minimize the harshness of the Service's suggested
excessive capitalization period. I d. at 841-42. Such sweeping of a shorter-lived, recurring
expenditure into the greater longer-lived structure offends a court's sense of justice.
202
See Gunn, supra note 53, at 492; see also Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income,
supra note 53, at 4 n.3 (listing the various assets that courts use to capitalize start-up costs).
198
198
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With a comparatively sparse discussion of depreciation, 203 the
cyclical aircraft engine maintenance T.A.M. buttressed its
conclusion on Revenue Ruling 88-57, which capitalized the cyclical
repair costs of freight-train cars and treated the reconditioned cars
as new assets under the general plan of rehabilitation doctrine. 204
The reconditioning of the railroad cars occurred every eight to ten
years, 205 and new cars were depreciated over eleven years under the

203

See Sheryl Stratton, IRS Draws Flak for Aircraft Overhaul Capitalization TAM, 73 Tax
Notes 119, 122 (Oct. 14, 1996) (crediting this observation to Professor Annette Nellen).
204
See Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36. Under a judicial gloss of section 162 or perhaps 263,
the otherwise deductible cost of a repair is capitalized if the repair was part of an overall
pattern of rehabilitation. See United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689-90 (lOth Cir. 1968)
("[C]ourts have superimposed ... an overriding precept that an expenditure made for an item
which is part of a 'general plan' of rehabilitation, modernization, and improvement of the
property, must be capitalized, even though, standing alone, the item may appropriately be
classified as one of repair."). The most sound rationale for this doctrine is that the execution
of a plan of rehabilitation constitutes the acquisition of a new capital asset so that all the
related expenses must be capitalized. See Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income,
supra note 53, at 34; see, e.g., California Casket Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 32, 37-38 (1952)
(requiring the capitalization of all renovation costs when the building was acquired with the
express intention of completely renovating it to conform with specific business requirements).
So viewed, the plan of rehabilitation rule is analogous to the rule that an expenditure which·
is part of the acquisition cost of a capital asset must be capitalized even though standing
alone, or incurred after the completion of the process of acquisition, would be deductible. See
Estate of Wilbur, 43 T.C. at 327 n.6 (1964) (capitalizing the last coat of paint applied during
construction), acq. 1965-2 C.B. 7; Mt. Morris Drive-In Theater Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.
272, 274-75 (1955) (capitalizing the cost of a drainage system installed after the completion
of the theater because it would have been capitalized as part of the original construction and
it was obvious that the drainage system was needed), affd, 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1956); Startup Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53, at 32-38. The Ninth Circuit correctly
limited the "rehabilitation doctrine" to substantial capital improvements and repairs to the
same specific asset, usually a structure in a state of disrepair. See Moss, 831 F.2d at 841.
205
See Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36. TEI has recently pointed out in a supplement to its
Submission of comments pursuant to Notice 96-7 that the railroad car reconditioning
occurred near the end of the useful life of the car and following a long period of continuous use
without repairs. Letter form James R. Murray of Tax Executive Institute, Inc., dated March
25, 1997, to Commissioner Margaret M. Richardson re: Capitalization Issues Under Notice
96-7 and Follow-up on IRS-TEI Liaison Meeting, reprinted in Additional Guidance Needed
Regarding Capitalization Issues, 97 Tax Notes Today 64-46 (Apr. 3, 1997) (LEXIS, FEDTAX
lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 97 TNT 64-46) ("The economic life of any asset, and the corresponding
asset guideline class and applicable MACRS class life in which the asset falls [twelve years
under Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674], is premised on the taxpayer undertaking periodic
repairs in order to keep the asset in an ordinarily efficient operating condition. Indeed,
following the T.A.M.'s reasoning to its logical extreme, periodic oil changes for automobiles
or delivery trucks would be subject to capitalization. Estab~hing a prudent policy of periodic
repairs and incurring expenses under that policy do not, in our view, transmogrifY periodic
repairs into a capital asset with a useful life beyond the year incurred.").
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then-applicable depreciation system. 206 By fortuity, the new asset
depreciation period was close to the right period for cyclical railroad
car repairs. This similarity may have misled the drafters of the
aircraft maintenance T.A.M. into believing that treating the
capitalized costs as new assets depreciable over eight years would
produce the proper result. In fact, the eight-year recovery period is
too long; it should approximate four years.
In support of its new asset treatment, the T.A.M. was on far
· sounder ground in concluding that "major engine inspection costs
had the effect of replacing the engine with a newly inspected and
reconditioned engine. "207 The airline normally would recover the
cost of a new engine over an eight-year period; therefore, the
Service could justify its eight-year recovery period for the
maintenance costs by characterizing the reconditioned engine as
new. . In this regard, section 168's prohibition of component
depreciation and requirement of composite depreciation 208 probably
motivated the Service's characterization. 209 Following Revenue
Procedure 87-57, any additions or improvements to property are
treated as separate properties with the same recovery period,
convention, and depreciation method as applicable to the
underlying property. 210 Instead of depreciating the maintenance
costs over their own period, the Service considered them to
constitute part of the engine and used the engine's recovery period.
Rough justice suggests, as an alternative to current deduction,
sidestepping these section 168 rules by treating the recurring
maintenance costs as creating a freestanding intangible asset or
deferred charge, apart from the engine, depreciable under section
167. 211 Treating the cost as a freestanding asset depreciable over

206

See G.C.M. 39,743 (July 14, 1988); see also G.C.M. 34,921 (June 26, 1972).
T.A.M. 96-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1996).
""' See I.R.C. § 168(i)(6). The component method depreciates a structure component-bycomponent according to the useful life of each component whereas composite depreciation
treats the structure as a whole and depreciates the entire structure as one unit.
209
The T.A.M. referred to the use of composite depreciation twice. See T.A.M. 96-18-004
(Jan. 23, 1996) ("[The airline) depreciates the aircraft and engines as one unit under the
composite method of depreciation.").
210
See Rev. Proc. 87-57, 1987-2 C.B. 687, 689.
211
See I.R.C. § 167(a) (permitting depreciation deductions for assets not covered by MACRS
in section 168).
207
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four years on a straight-line basis212 under section 167 minimizes
the income distortion that occurs by depreciating the maintenance
as a reconditioned engine purchase under section 168 over eight
years. Once again, this is an attempt to settle on the middle
ground. 213 Moreover, to the extent that the cyclical safety
inspection costs largely consist of removing the engines, taking
them apart, and inspecting and reassembling rather than replacing
parts, those costs do not resemble permanent improvements.
The proposed freestanding depreciable intangible approach
mirrors that taken by the Tax Court in Wolfsen Land & Cattle. The
taxpayer in Wolfsen Land & Cattle incurred substantial costs in
dredging irrigation ditches every ten years in lieu of performing
annual maintenance. 214 The parties presented the court with two
income distorting options: either allow a current deduction of the
substantial costs or capitalize the costs to the non-depreciable basis
of the land with an indefinitely useful life. 215 Judge Sterrett
unraveled this Gordian knot 216 by treating the maintenance cost
itself as a deferred charge depreciable over ten years: 217
The ideal rule for capital recovery would include indexing the asset's basis for inflation
and using the economic life with straight-line depreciation. See 2 U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra
note 48, at 151-211 (1984). Failure of such rules to account for greater use in particular years
may prevent those rules from being perfect. See Douglas A. Kahn, Accelerated
Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 Mich. L.
Rev. 1, 42 (1979). Certainly straight-line depreciation over the period benefited without other
adjustments is not the ideal rule, but it is probably close enough for tax expenditure analysis.
Contra id. Other academics have suggested a wide variety of ideal rules to account for multiperiod costs. See, e.g., Thomas L. Evans, The Taxation of Multi-Period Projects: An Analysis
of Competing Models, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1109 (1991); Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive
Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 722 (1990); Larry D. Ward, Tax Postponement and
the Cash Method Farmer: An Analysis of Revenue Ruling 75-152, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 1119 (1975).
213
See NCNB Corp. v. Commissioner, 684 F.2d at 295 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (finding
"an opportunity to resort to the golden mean"); cf supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
214
Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 8.
215
ld. at 13. In an uncharacteristic reversal of roles, the Service argued for an immediate
deduction and the taxpayer sought capitalization. Id. at 10. Perhaps the Service's position
was principled; an immediate deduction produces less distortion than capitalization without
amortization. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. A more likely explanation,
however, is that the Service attempted to put the dredging costs into an earlier tax year so
that the benefit of the deduction would be barred by the statute of limitations.
216
Alexander the Great, of course, cut through the Gordian knot with his sword. Courts
may believe that such option is open only to Congress; they must unravel the problem. See
Board of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1168 (7th Cir. 1982) (Campbell, J.,
concurring).
217
Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13; accord Rev. Rul. 68-483, 1968-2 C.B. 91
212
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Thus, we are faced with something of a conundrum, how do we
treat a maintenance-type expense substantial in amount, which
only restores its subject to its original operating condition, yet
need be repeated only on the average of every 10 years and is
performed on a subject of indefinite life.
To permit a current deduction of such a large expenditure with
a beneficial effect lasting on the average of 10 years would surely
distort that [year's] income. Yet to deny even an amortization
deduction for an expenditure with a specific demonstrable
beneficial life on the grounds that its deductibility is
contaminated by its relationship to an asset of indefinite life, i.e.,
the land, would similarly require an uneven reporting of income.
Since a basic premise of the income tax laws is to relate expenses
to the income which they helped earn, a reasonable solution to
our conundrum is to hold that the expenses in issue should be
written off over their useful life. In short we would subscribe
independent status to those expenditures on the basis that they
create a free-standing intangible asset with an amortizable 10year life. 218

(depreciating recurring redredging costs as a freestanding asset over the period until the next
required redredging); cf Gunn, supra note 53, at 446 ("The distinction between asset as cost
and asset as property may be helpful in determining the proper period for recovery of
capitalized costs through depreciation or amortization.").
218
Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13 (footnote omitted).
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This common sense solution219 is equally applicable to cyclical
aircraft maintenance costs. Given the ambiguous results under the
de minimis and recurring prongs, the airline probably should
depreciate the costs separately as freestanding intangible assets
over each four-year period of benefit to assure that no distortion of
income occurs.
Ironically, the factors weighing against the use of a four-year
recovery period are the horizontal equity and economic efficiency
goals of taxation. Horizontal equity seeks to treat similarly
situated taxpayers similarly. 220 Economic efficiency attempts to
avert any influence that a tax might have on taxpayers' decisions
about the use of economic resources. 221 These two goals appear
Unfortunately, the Service has refused to adopt generally the depreciation of a
freestanding intangible asset approach to recurring costs. But see T.A.M. 94-24-002 (Feb. 9,
1994) (using the period of recurrence as the useful life to depreciate the costs incurred to raise
a sinking seawall). Consequently, it often strains to find an appropriate depreciable asset
that could have the recurring costs tied to it. For example, in the case of employee training
costs, the Service initially permitted depreciation of capitalized new nuclear power plant
employee training costs over the life of the building in which the workforce was employed.
See T.A.M. 75-09-099-440A (Sept. 9, 1975). Contemporaneously, the Service capitalized
training costs as start-up costs of a new plant in an existing lumber business as a depreciable
intangible asset-"an operational fiberboard plant." See T.A.M. 75-04-281-070A (Apr. 28,
1975); cf G.C.M. 37,500 (Apr. 5, 1978) (suggesting, but not ruling, that pre-opening costs like
training should be capitalized and amortized over the life of the facility). Subsequently,
during the period the Service followed the separate asset doctrine, it allowed a current
deduction for the costs of training a work force in connection with the establishment of a new
manufacturing facility by a taxpayer with similar existing operational plants in other
locations. See T.A.M. 83-03-012 (Oct. 7, 1982), modifying T.A.M. 82-04-061 (Oct. 28, 1981).
Later, the Service amortized employee training costs over the life of a plant's forty-year
Nuclear Regulatory Commission license. See T.A.M. 94-30-003 (Apr. 22, 1994). This
awkward progression strongly suggests that the Service should recognize generally the
approach of capitalizing costs as freestanding assets depreciated over their own useful lives.
220
See Sneed, supra note 148, at 579; 2 U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 48, at 151-211; see,
e.g., Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. at 14 (requiring the capitalization of depreciation from
vehicles used during self-construction projects to maintain tax parity with taxpayers that hire
independent contractors because the contractors would include the depreciation in their
charge that the taxpayer would capitalize as paid); cf. Iowa-Des Moines, 592 F.2d at 436
{permitting a taxpayer to deduct credit screening costs paid to outsiders in part because the
costs of performing the screening in-house would have been currently deductible).
221
See Sneed, supra note 148, at 586-90. Judge Posner provides a good explanation of this
policy:
Because ofthe time value of money-real riskless interest rates are positive-a deduction
taken today is worth more than one taken a year from now. Hence if an expense
incurred to produce future income can be deducted from current income rather than
postponed until it has borne its fruits, taxpayers will have an incentive to incur such
expenses earlier than they would if there were no income tax; and tax law seeks, to the
extent compatible with revenue and distributive objectives, to interfere as little as
219
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violated by the contrary treatment of airlines that maintain
engines in a rotable parts pool and airlines that purchase
replacement engines. 222 Self-repairing airlines that draw upon a
rotable part pool, to replace the engines in aircraft while
performing the inspection on the removed engines, could justifY
using a four-year recovery period. They would treat the overhaul
costs as a freestanding asset. Conversely, airlines that purchase
replacement engines and perform inspections on the removed
engines before returning them to the seller would capitalize the
inspection costs as part of the acquisition price. As demonstrated
above, a newly reconditioned and inspected engine is depreciable
over an eight-year period. 223 Thus, different treatment is afforded
two similarly situated taxpayers, with self-repairing airlines
receiving a preference of a shorter recovery period. 224
Conceptually, the true parity problem may be that an eight-year
recovery period fails to account for extraordinary obsolescence. The
need for major inspections and overhauls of engines every four
years suggests that aircraft engines simply fall within the wrong
recovery property class. In that case, the answer to the lack of
parity between airlines that self-repair and those that purchase
reconditioned engines is not to lengthen the period, from four to
eight years, for recovering costs capitalized as freestanding
intangible assets. Instead, the better answer provides for this
extraordinary obsolescence legislatively through MACRS or
perhaps administratively or judicially under the clear reflection of
income standard.

possible with the pattern of expenditures that would exist in the absence of taxation.
Fishman u. Commissioner, 837 F.2d 309, 312 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.); accord Cabintaxi
Corp., 63 F.3d at 619 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) ("The purpose of these [start-up cost) rules
(the second, the requirement of capitalization, more clearly than the first [of not yet carrying
on a trade or business)) is to require the matching of expenses to income temporally, a major
objective of efficient tax policy.") (citation omitted).
222
See supra note 194 (discussing the industry practice of using either a parts pool or
acquiring replacement engines to minimize the downtime while servicing aircraft).
223
See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
224
Airlines that lease engines presumably pay fairly level annual rental payments. Thus,
the airlines obtain much the same annual dollar deduction result by annually deducting the
rent for four years as by depreciating the capitalized costs of repairs as a freestanding asset
over four years.
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4. More-Trouble-Than-It's- Worth
Based on tax considerations alone, the T.A.M.'s facts do not
indicate that the burdens of capitalization/depreciation outweigh
the benefit of a more clear reflection of income. For a large
taxpayer, the administrative costs of compliance are minor. In
particular, the clearly identifiable period of recurrence-four
years-provides the ideal depreciation period. This period assures
against income distortion and avoids the burden of attempting to
estimate a proper recovery period. This method also avoids any
perceived horizontal inequity in the transportation industry by
treating the airline as all other taxpayers that must capitalize their
repair costs.
These tax considerations alone make
capitalization/depreciation over four years worthwhile.
Political factors, however, raise the Service's administrative costs
and make it more-trouble-than-it's-worth.
The threat of
congressional intervention into the administration of the tax laws
might derail the Service's post-/NDOPCO strategy of
incrementalism and regulation by litigation rather than by
regulations. These political factors will concentrate on non-tax
policies without regard to the tax standard of achieving a clear
reflection of income. Deviations from the ideal tax policy will
establish contrary precedent that make the already difficult area of
capitalization more confusing.
The non-tax policy arguments raised against the airline
maintenance T.A.M. may call to mind the fate of the soil
remediation T.A.M. previously issued by the Service. 225 The soil
remediation T.A.M. capitalized substantial and fairly non-recurring
costs to treat soil "contaminated" by PCPs, which were dumped
after they had lubricated machines that pumped natural gas. 226 As
it tums out, that T.A.M. allowed depreciation of such capitalized
costs over the life of the pipeline used by the natural gas pumping
company. 227 This laudable result 228 was reversed by a published
0

225
T.A.M. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992); see also Stratton, supra note 203, at 122 (indicating
that Professor Annette Nellen noted this similarity).
226
T.A.M. 93-15-004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
227
These facts were gleaned from tax journals and a subsequent article by Glenn
Carrington. See Glenn R. Carrington, Capitalization After Indopco, 53 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n §
25.01, § 25.03[5)[c], at 25-29 to 25-30 (1995); see also Avakian-Martin & Carson, supra note

1997]

Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs

221

ruling that allowed a current deduction of the remediation costs. 229
A current deduction was not allowed on the basis of sound tax
policy, instead it resulted from intense political opposition.
Sacrificing tax policy for the sake oflargely political arguments
of critics cannot provide the right answer to this problem. A hasty
exception granted to one interest group only encourages others to
badger the Service for similar exceptions. Conversely, ignoring
non-tax policies invites congressional intervention to correct the
frustration of certain social goals. These alternatives threaten the
consistency of the tax laws. This threat certainly suggests that
requiring the capitalization of the airline maintenance ·costs is
simply more-trouble-than-it's-worth.
The apparent disapproval of the Service's position with respect
to the cost of cyclical aircraft engine overhauls portends that
Congress will step in and attempt to protect what it sees as a threat
to a governmental airline safety policy. The apparent orchestration
of events culminating in the House Conference Committee Report
verbally chastising the Service's position on these costs230 seems an
omen of Chairman Archer's plan to bypass· the pay-go rules 231
should the Service continue ignoring his requests to consider FAA
safety policies in determining how to treat these costs. Congress
has assumed the role of guardian in the past. In several instances
during the second half of the 1970's, Congress prohibited the
Service from executing particular aspects of the tax law. 232
Congress has instituted similar prohibitions on other government
agencies in a host of other areas as well. 233
145, at 925·26.
228
See Juliann Avakian-Martin, Does the IRS Need to Clean Up its Ruling on Cleanup
Costs?, 59 Tax Notes 728, 729 (May 10, 1993) (quoting Professor John Lee's approval of the
soil remediation T.A.M.).
229
See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (permitting a current deduction for soil remediation
costs but requiring the capitalization of the cost of a permanent ground water cleaning
facility).
230
See supra notes 9, 13, 24, 28 and accompanying text. It is probably no coincidence that
the date of Chairman Archer's news release of his Jetter to Commissioner Richardson
corresponds with when the Budget Committee was deciding on the IRS budget for the next
fiscal year.
231
See supra note (discussing the "pay-go" procedures).
232
See Pamell, supra note 26, at 1370-75.
233
See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987
Duke L. J. 456, 461-63 (1987).
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One technique, seen in the Tax Reform Act of 1976,234 suspended
the application of a revenue ruling mandating the capitalization of
prepublication costs 235 by "substitut[ing] earlier IRS rules for IRS.
execution in place of subsequent Service rules." 236 This suspension
was to last until prospective regulations dealing with
prepublication expenditures were issued. 237 The generic term in the
literature for such legislative strategies is "limitation riders." The
classic limitation rider is a floor amendment or "rider" to an
appropriations bill that prohibits the agency from using any funds
generally appropriated to the agency for a specific purpose
identified by Congress during the next fiscal year. In the tax arena,
limitation riders commonly are enacted by revenue, rather than
appropriation, acts without amending the Internal Revenue
Code. 238
The use of limitation riders, to suspend application of the
reasoning in the aircraft maintenance T.A.M. until promulgating
regulations, would be the least intrusive potential Congressional
interference with IRS and Treasury administration of the

234

Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2119, 90 Stat. 1520, 1912 (1976).
See Rev. Rul. 73-395, 1973 C.B. 87 (requiring capitalization but "allowing" depreciation
under the income forecast method).
·
236
See Parnell, supra note 26, at 1370. See id. 1370-71, 1371 n. 77. Section 2119 of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 stated that the
application of sections 61 (as it relates to cost of goods sold), 162, 174, 263, and 471 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to any prepublication expenditure shall be
administered-(!) without regard to Revenue Ruling 73-395, and (2) in the manner in
which such sections were applied consistently by the taxpayer to such expenditures
before the date of the issuance of such revenue ruling.
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2119, 90 Stat. 1520, 1912 (1976). Chairman Archer's complaint that
Chief Counsel Brown failed to even acknowledge that the Service's treatment of the cyclical
aircraft engine safety inspections was a new interpretation takes on a new light against this
backdrop. See Archer Reply, supra note 19.
237
See Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2119. Such regulations were never issued. Instead,
Treasury believes that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 superseded this provision. See Temp. Reg.
§ 263A, 52 Fed. Reg. 10,052, 10,054 (1987) ("If, and to the extent, that section 2119 of the
1976 Act would otherwise contravene the clear Congressional intent underlying section 263A
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 regarding the production of books, then section 263A, the more
recent expression of Congressional intent, is properly viewed as the legally determinative
provision and section 2119 is viewed as modified, accordingly."). As long as noted author
Senator Patrick Daniel Moynihan, D-N.Y., serves on the Senate Finance Committee, the
Treasury's belief might not be very sound.
.
238
See Parnell, supra note 26, at 1370-71; discussion infra part IV.
235
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capitalization standards. 239 Ideally these regulations would be
issued after a public hearing in which FAA representatives
participated. 24° Congress could also express its concern with the
Service's disregard for airline safety policy by prohibiting
consideration of the cyclical aircraft engine inspection T.A.M. or,
even more broadly, by cutting off funding for selected activities, 241
including audits or development of industry guidelines dealing with
capitalization. If Chairman Archer's long-term goal is "to tear out
the income tax by its roots,"242 he would certainly be willing to
prune a capitalization limb or two now.
However, such
congressional guidance is not without its risks, in that it could very

If the Service continues to ignore FAA airline safety policy, the House acting in this
manner is a virtual certainty.
240
A thesis of this article is that the new formulations of capitalization rules should be1
through public rule making and ideally through negotiated rulemaking resulting in
structured discretionary justice regulations.
241
In the 1970's Congress repeatedly substituted prior IRS rules for proposed regulations
or revenue rulings. Examples were rules as to salary reduction plans, employer reporting of
tips paid to employees by charge cards, deductibility of travel expenses, and nonqualified
deferred compensation plans. Parnell, supra note 26, at 1370-72. Commentators were even
more critical of congressional prohibitions at this time of IRS providing nationwide guidance
without any substitution of a prior IRS rule thereby creating a total administrative ruling
void as was the case with fringe benefits. Parnell, supra note 26, at 1372-74. On occasion
without amending the taxing statute, Congress prohibited IRS guidance but provided
guidelines for rulings as in the case of classification of taxpayers as employees or independent
contractors. Parnell, supra note 26, at 1373-74. Still another tack during this era was to limit
IRS use of appropriated funds to implement nationwide guidance as in the case of denial of
tax-exempt status to schools on account of racial discrimination. Devins, supra note 233, at
1374. See Devins, supra note 233, for additional non-tax examples. Professor Devins points
out that House rules now restrict the last approach of appropriation limitations. Parnell,
supra note 26, at 462.
242
142 Cong. Rec. H3408 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (Remarks of House Ways and Means
Chairman Bill Archer, R-Tex.); Transcript of W&M Hearing on Impact of Tax Reform on
Manufacturing, Energy, Natural Resources (July 31, 1996), 96 Tax Notes Today 154-27 (Aug.
7, 1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 154-27) (Remarks of Chairman Bill
Archer, R-Tex.) ("[I]t is my goal in the years that I will continue to serve in the Congress to
tear the income tax out by its roots and to get the IRS completely and totally out of the lives
of every individual American."); Archer Announces Hearing on ~eplacing the Federal Income
Tax and Its Impact on Small Business (Apr. 1, 1996), reprinted in W&M Schedules Hearing
on Effect of Tax Reform on Small Business, 96 Tax Notes Today 65-19 (Apr. 2, 1996) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 95-19) ("In announcing the hearings, Chairman
Archer stated, 'This hearing is a continuation of our effort to replace the Federal income tax.
My goal is to tear out the income tax by its roots so that it can never grow back. I believe that
small businesses will be significant beneficiaries of a new, simpler tax system."'); Rosenbaum,
supra note 12; Editorial, Income Tax or Sales Tax, Wash. Post, June 6, 1995, at A18; Peter
Passel, The Tax Code Heads into the Operating Room, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1995, at 3-1, col.
2.
239
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well subject the Service's interpretation of applicable tax law to
congressional micromanagement. 243
Regardless, these early
indications suggest that the Service should consider the role of nontax policies when interpreting the tax laws.
IV. CONSIDERATION OFFAA SAFETY POLICY IN FASHIONING TAX
POLICY: THE PuBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE

The obvious public safety issues that pervade the subject of
aircraft maintenance costs raise the question of whether the
Service should consider non-tax public policy in fashioning tax
policy with regard to the treatment of these costs. This article sets
forth the thesis that a two-step analysis should apply in
determining whether public policy expressed in a non-tax statute
or rule sh~uld be taken into account in the formulation of a given
tax policy. According to this analysis, in order for non-tax policy to
be considered in the modeling of tax policy, Congress or the courts
must first have clearly identified an overlap of this recognized nontax policy with the tax policy in question. The second step of the
analysis would then require that the application of this general tax
policy severely frustrate the non-tax policy with which it overlaps.
The classic public policy tax doctrine required legislative
identification ofthe non-tax public policy. Historically, the Service ·
has taken the public policy underlying judicial decisions and
federal, state, and local legislation into account in the formulation
of tax policy in certain areas. The following discussion examines
how the Service has historically applied non-tax policy in some of
these areas.

243
Tax Executives Institute-Department of the Treasury Liaison Meeting (Nov. 19, 1996),
reprinted in Agenda for TEl-Treasury Liaison Meeting, 96 Tax Notes Today 228-32 (Nov. 22,
1996) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 96 TNT 228-32) (waming Treasury that "the
dearth of generally applicable guidance places taxpayers in the position of having to seek
clarification of any challenged expense deduction, and may well open the door to Congress's
micromanaging the IRS's interpretation of the tax law").

1997]

Cyclical Aircraft Maintenance Costs

225

A. Previous Applications of Non- Tax Public Policy

1. Public Policy Doctrine: Ab Initio
As early as 1919, Treasury took broad non-tax policy into account
in fashioning remedial rules as to involuntary conversions due to
World War I. Without a statutory basis, the Revenue Act of 1918
Regulations provided that the amount received by a taxpayer (a) for
property lost or destroyed in whole or in part through fire, storm,
shipwreck, or other casualty, or (b) in requisition or eminent
domain proceedings resulting in a loss of title to property (or
voluntary conveyance induced by reason of an imminent proceeding
for such a purpose) was taxable only to the extent gain exceeded the
amount actually and reasonably expended to "replace or restore the
property substantially in kind, exclusive of any expenditures for
additions or betterments."244
Treasury's Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918 recommended a
statutory amendment providing for a "replacement fund for the
replacement in kind of lost or damaged property."245 These Notes
clearly rested their involuntary conversion proposal on a general
hardship policy. 246 This public policy consideration, spawned by the
flurry of involuntary conversions from the war, can be seen in the
Revenue Act of 1921, retroactively applicable in this instance to
''' Treasury Department, Regulations 45 Relating to the Income Tax and War Profits and
Excess Profits Tax Under the Revenue Act of 1918, H.R. Doc. No. 1826, 65th Cong., 3d Sess.,
Art. 47, 26-27 (1919).
245
Secretary of Treasury, Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918, § 213(e) (1919).
246
See id. Section 213(e) provides:
During the war, in the case of property requisitioned for war purposes by the
Government and property lost or destroyed in whole or in part through war hazards,
especially in the case of ships, it happened that at the time of requisition or loss the
market value of such ships was considerably increased over the cost or market value as
of March 1, 1913, in cases in which the property was acquired prior to that date, and
that in practically no case would the taxpayer have been willing to sell the property for
its appraised value at the time of requisition or loss.
To require the taxpayer to pay income and war profits and excess profits taxes upon the
difference between the cost or market price on March 1, 1913, and the compensation
received at the time of requisition or loss would have been to take such a large
proportion of the amount received for the vessel that, although the owner desired to
replace the same, the taking of the tax by the Government would have made it
impossible in practically every instance.
I d.
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1918. 247 This Act provided relief to taxpayers whose property was
converted for government use, by allowing a deduction for amounts
the taxpayer expended from the proceeds of "compulsorily or
involuntarily" converted property or its equivalent "in the
acquisition of other property of a character similar or related in
service or use to the property so converted."248 Thus the Act clearly
showed an early congressional recognition of the utility of using
non-tax public policy to help shape tax policies that would best
serve the public interests.

2. Public Policy Doctrine:
Payments

Deduction Disallowance of Penalty

The most widely known tax rule that takes non-tax policies into
account is the common law frustration of public policy doctrine that
limits the allowance of certain deductions otherwise allowable
based upon the literal language of the Code. In one instance, the
public policy at stake was the deductibility of illegal payments and
penalties. This doctrine's limitation was initially a judicial gloss on
the section 162 249 term "necessary," 250 which the Service later
adopted, 251 based upon the Chief Counsel's Office acknowledgment
that the ensuing flood of lower court decisions were difficult to

See Pelican Bay Lumber Co. v. Blair, 31 F.2d 15, 16 (9th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S.
870 (1929).
248
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a)(12), 42 Stat. 227, 241 (1921). Altematively, a
deduction was provided for the acquisition of 80% or more of the stock or shares of a
corporation owning such other property or in the establishment of Commissioner approved
replacement fund. See id.
249
I.R.C. § 162(a) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .... ").
250
See Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958) (holding that an
expenditure otherwise qualifying as a business expense under section 162 could not qualify
as necessary "if allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or state
policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some govemmental declaration
thereof').
251
See Rev. Rul. 54-27, 1954-1 C.B. 44; see also G.C.M. 38,611 (Jan. 16, 1981), considering
Rev. Rul. 82-127, 1982-1 C.B. 215, declaring obsolete Rev. Rul. 54-27, 1954-1 C.B. 44.
247
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reconcile 252 and that subsequent Supreme Court cases only
confused matters further. 253
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 254 Congress's intent to codify a
limitation of the public policy doctrine as to ordinary and necessary
business expenses came to fruition in the amendment of section
These
162(c)255 and the addition of sections 162(£) and (g). 256
sections operated to deny deductions for certain illegal bribes,
kickbacks, and other payments; 257 deductions for "any fine or
similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any
law;"258 and deductions of certain treble damage payments under
the antitrust laws. 259 The 1969 Senate Finance Committee Report
explained the Committee's rationale for the changes and additions
under sections 162(c), (f), and (g) as provisions, designed "for the
denial of the deduction for payments in these [section 162(c), (f),
and (g)] situations ... deemed to violate public policy [which are]
intended to be all inclusive. Public policy, in other circumstances,
generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify the
disallowance of d~ductions." 260

252
See G.C.M. 36,671 (Mar. 30, 1976) (citing "Dwight, The Doctrine of Public Policy, 46
Taxes 377 (1968); Gordon, The Public Policy Limitation on Deductions from Gross Income:
A Conceptual Analysis, 43 Indiana L.J. 406 (1968); ~·ler, Disallowance of Deductions on
Public Policy Grounds, 20 Tax L. Rev. 665 (1965); Lamont, Controversial Aspects of Ordinary
and Necessary Business Expenses, 42 Taxes 808 (1964); Lindsay, Tax Deductions and Public
Policy, 41 Taxes 711 (1963); and Note, Business Expenses, Disallowance and Public Policy:
Some Problems of Sanctioning With the Internal Revenue Code, 72 Yale L.J. 108 (1962)"); see
also O.M. 18,744 (Dec. 22, 1976), Illegal Bribes, Kickbacks and Other Payments; John Y.
Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes and Damage Payments and Recoveries, 25 Tax L. Rev. 611
(1970).
253
See James J. Freeland et al., Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation, 539-44 (9th ed.
1996), and Paul R. McDaniel et al., Federal Income Taxation, 374-89, 484-85 (Foundation
Press 3d ed. 1994), for an excellent summary of the modern rules.
254
Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
255
I.R.C. § 162(c). The Revenue Act of 1971 further amended section 162(c). See Pub. L.
No. 92-178,85 Stat. 497 (1971).
256
I.R.C. §§ 162(f), (g). Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §
13222, 107 Stat. 312, 477 (1993); in a similar vein disallows any deduction for lobbying
expenses in amended section 162(e).
257
I.R.C. § 162(c).
258
I.R.C. § 162(f).
259

I.R.C. § 162(g).

260

S. Rep. No. 91-552, at 274 (1969) ..
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One of the problems inherent in Congress's implementation of
public policy in the formulation of tax policy, however, is the
Service's propensity not to follow these limitations when applying
that public policy. For example, despite the Committee's limitation
on public policy as a reason to disallow deductions in situations
beyond those addressed in sections 162(c), (f), and (g), the Service
readily ruled that its disallowance of a section 165 loss, based on a
violation of public policy, remained unchanged by the Tax Reform
Act amendments and stated congressional policy. 261 Moreover, the
Service extended the same arguments it traditionally used to
support its public policy gloss on "necessary" even further by
finding that expenses resulting from behavior which violated public
policy were not "ordinary'' business expenses in that they were not
normal, common, usual, or customary. 262 Ultimately this tack
resulted in holdings such as that in Raymond Bertolini Trucking
Co. v. Commissioner, 263 where the Tax Court disallowed a deduction
for regular kickback payments which violated a (decidedly
unenforced) Chicago anti-kickback statute because these costs were
not "ordinary" in the public policy sense. 264 This holding produced
precisely the same result as application of a common law public
policy doctrine that Congress had sought to bar in 1969, which
probably underlies the Sixth Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court. 265

See G.C.M. 36,965 (Dec. 22, 1976), considering Rev. Rul. 77-442, 1977-2 C.B. 264 ("Our
position is that the amendments to Code § 162 do not limit public policy considerations
applicable to other sections of the Code ... .");see also Rev. Rul. 77-126, 1977-1 C.B. 48,
considered in G.C.M. 36,665 (Mar. 26, 1976); accord, Rev. Rul. 81-151, 1981-1 C.B. 74,
considered in G.C.M. 38,547 (Oct. 24, 1980); Rev. Rul. 81-24, 1981-1 C.B. 175 and Rev. Rul.
82-74, 1982-1 C.B. 110, considered in G.C.M. 37,985 (June 19, 1979); G.C.M. 36,962 (Dec. 22,
1976) and attached O.M. 18,744 (Dec. 22, 1976), Illegal Bribes, Kickbacks and Other
Payments.
262
See O.M. 18,744 (Dec. 22, 1976), Illegal Bribes, Kickbacks and Other Payments, supra
note 255. Perhaps the better position is set forth in Judge Sterrett's dissent in Mazzei u.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 497, 506 (1974) (Sterrett, J., dissenting) ("(W]hen a deduction should
be denied should remain under the control of Congress.") (emphasis omitted). Judge
Tannenwald's concurring opinion illustrates the attraction of the public policy doctrine to the
fact finder. See id. at 504 (Tannenwald, J., concurring) ("The obvious reply to the contention
that my approach may involve 'the task of grading criminal activity' is that, ... the courts will
simply be dealing with another instance of line-drawing which is part of the daily grist of
judicial life."); see also McDaniel eta!., supra note 253, at 484-85.
263
45 T.C.M. (CCH) 44 (1982), reu'd, 736 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1984).
264
45 T.C.M. (CCH) at 50.
265
See Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1984).
261
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Charitable Exemptions and Illegal

A second area of taxation in which public policy has played a
major role is qualification as a charitable organization under
section 501(c)(3). 266 This area actually provided the most natural
niche of all for public policy, given the fact that the Code does not
define "charitable ... purposes."267 Instead, the regulations use the
"broad outlines of'charity' as developed by judicial decisions" as the
benchmark for the tax-exempt purposes set forth in section
501(c)(3). 268 The Service interpreted these common-law decisions
as establishing the notion that neither the purposes nor
operations 269 of an exempt charity could be illegal or contrary to
public policy.
The Service also has relied upon the general trust law
prohibition of purposes and activities that are illegal or contrary to
public policy as an interpretive tool in justifying the denial of taxexempt status to organizations. 270 In Revenue Ruling 71-447, the
Service utilized the general common law of charitable trusts to
determine that racially discriminatory private schools were not
described in section 501(c)(3) because they violated a clear federal
public policy against racial discrimination in education. 271 The
Supreme Court in effect confirmed this determination in Bob Jones
266

2s1

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
Id.

Reg.§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1996).
General Counsel Memorandum 37,858 describes the operational test for determining
tax-exempt status:
[I]fthe overall consequences of carrying on such activities would be contrary to public
policy, the organization carrying on the activities will not qualify for exemption under
section 501(c)(3) regardless of the legality of the activities. For instance, although the
granting of scholarships is, in and of itself, legal and not contrary to public policy, such
activity will be considered contrary to public policy if the scholarships are limited in
such a way that the overall effect of the activity is to promote racial discrimination in
education.
G.C.M. 37,858 (Feb. 16, 1979).
270
See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 377 cmt. c ( 1959) (noting that a charitable trust
cannot be created for a purpose which is illegal or contrary to public policy); Iva A. Scott, The
Law of Trusts § 377 (4th ed. 1989) (stating that where a policy is articulated in a statute
making certain conduct a criminal offense, a trust is illegal if its performance involves such
criminal conduct or tends to encourage such conduct).
271
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
268

269

230

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 17:161

University v. United States, 272 which revoked the tax-exempt status
of the university due to the school's prohibition of interracial
relationships. 273
The Service has also indicated that it will focus upon whether the
activities of purportedly exempt organizations are contrary to a
fundamental public policy. In outlining its analysis of the public
policy doctrine, the Service relied upon the Supreme Court's
opinion in Bob Jones University for guidance, stating:
We believe that in Bob Jones the Court set a standard that the
public policy involved must be fundamental and there must be no
doubt that the activity involved is contrary to that fundamental
public policy.

In beginning our analysis of whether the activities of the
Association violate a fundamental public policy we must first
determine whether the public policy involved is clear and
fundamental. Then consideration must be given to whether the
specific activities of the Association violate that fundamental
public policy. 274

The Service, however, has yet to clearly set forth a consistent
definition and scope of what constitutes a fundamental public
policy. The Service has stated that it only rarely denies section
501(c)(3) status "based on illegal acts or violations of clear federal
public policy outside the area of racial discrimination in
education."275 While the frequency of such an application of public
policy may not be great, the scope of public policies considered in
General Counsel Memoranda (and more rarely published rulings

272

461 U.S. 574 (1983).
See id. at 605; see also Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable
Organizations, 3 Va. Tax Rev. 291 (1983) (criticizing the Court's reading of the trust law
doctrine in Bob Jones while supporting the Court's conclusion to deny the school's section
501(c)(3) exemption under a broader theory of public policy).
274
G.C.M. 39,800 (Oct. 25, 1989); see also G.C.M. 36,797 (July 23, 1976) ("Formal legislative
action on the national level is commonly regarded as a controlling determinant of Federal
public policy with regard to the subject of such legislation."); see, e.g., Building Serv.
Employees lnt'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537-38 (1950) (affirming its earlier
pronouncement in Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931)
(stating that it is primarily "for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the State.")).
275
G.C.M. 39,800 (Oct. 25, 1989).
273
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and cases) in fact is broad. 276 Even though a strict definition of
"fundamental" is lacking, an argument can be made that the
legislative and judicial recognition prong of the suggested analysis
is tantamount to the requirement that only fundamental public
policy should be considered.

4. Public Policy Doctrine: Preserving Statutory Subsidies
The public policy doctrinal area that is conceptually closest to the
cyclical aircraft overhaul tax issue arose from tax shelter
preferences used by individuals to offset income from other
activities and investments. Repeatedly during the 1970's, the
Service modified certain doctrines that were a part of its tax policy
in order to avoid thwarting Congress's clear intent of providing a
particular subsidy or tax preference. From the perspective of this
article, the determinative factor was Congress's awareness of the
overlap of public policy and tax policy as evidenced by these
subsidies.
One example of the Service's reversal oftax policy in recognition
of congressional public policy occurred in the waning days of the
Ford Administration. In 1977, Commissioner Don Alexander
proposed anti-tax-shelter revisions to the "association" (an entity
tax classification) regulations which would have taxed many passthrough277limited partnerships as corporations. 278 These revisions

276
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204 (holding that an anti-war protest
organization could not be exempt because its primary activity was sponsoring protest
demonstrations in which participants were urged to commit violations oflocal ordinances and
breaches of public order); G.C.M. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991) ("(E]ngaging in conduct or
arrangements that violate the anti-kickback statute is inconsistent with continued exemption
as a charitable hospital."); G.C.M. 39,800 (Oct. 25, 1989) (determining that insufficient
evidence existed to find a violation of fundamental public policy of the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution from a tax-exempt organization paying the salary of a public
high school teacher who taught three courses on the Bible as literature and history); G.C.M.
37, 858 (Feb. 16, 1979) (holding that rent strikes, economic boycotts, picketing, and mass
demonstrations, although legal, must be closely analyzed to determine whether they are
contrary to public policy); G.C.M. 36,797 (July 23, 1976) (finding that an apprentice training
school that gave a preference to Native Americans was exempt since it carried out national
public policy as provided for by federal legislation).
277
In this context the essence of a pass-through entity is the ability of the owner to deduct
currently the owner's "share" of the entity's tax losses, which are "passed through" to the
owner. I.R.C. §§ 702(a), 704(a), and 704(d).
278
See Prop. Reg.§ 301.7701-l(b), (c), 42 Fed. Reg. 1038-44 (1977); see generally Lee, supra
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would have ended the use of tax losses from limited partnerships'
real estate activities as passive offsets to partners' income from
services and investments. 279 However, the regulations were
''hastily withdrawn" upon the Department of Housing and Urban
Development's (HUD) protest that such a revision would hinder its
attempts to encourage investments in low-income housing. 280 In
essence, Treasury subordinated its application of the tax policy of
"corporate resemblance" 281 to HUD's policy of encouraging private
investment in low-income housing.
The Service revealed its rationale behind this subordination of
tax policy to HUD's non-tax policy in Revenue Ruling 79-300. 282 In
this ruling, the Service explained that the application of the section
183283 profit motive requirement to low-income housing projects, .
qualifying under section 236 of the National Housing Act
[hereinafter NHA section 236], would frustrate the congressional
intent of encouraging the construction of low-income housing. 284
Most significantly, the ruling noted that Congress had Been aware

note 114, at 61 n.9.
279
See Prop. Reg.§ 301.7701-l{b), (c). This revision would have had the same immediate
practical effect as the Passive Activities Loss [hereinafter PAL) rules eventually enacted in
1986 (and much more adverse long-term effect since PAL only suspends the passed-through
losses, whereas association treatment traps the losses inside the entity which is taxed as a
C corporation). See I.R.C. § 469.
280
See Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 42 Fed. Reg. 1489 (1977); Note, Tax
Classification of Limited Partnerships: The IRS Bombards the Tax Shelters, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
408, 410 (1977); Alan S. Oser, Battle is Joined on I.R.S. Partnership-Corporation Ruling, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 7,1977, atA11.
291
See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 185 (1976) (holding that a tax shelter limited
partnership "failed" the mechanical test of corporate resemblance under the regulations
because it lacked continuity of life and limited liability and hence was not an association
taxable as a corporation as the IRS asserted).
282
1979-2 C.B. 112, considered in G.C.M. 38,117 (Sept. 28, 1979).
283
I.R.C. § 183 (setting forth the "hobby loss" rules requiring that an activity be engaged
in for profit for the deductibility of losses under sections 162, 167, and 212); see generally
Start-up Costs and Clear Reflection of Income, supra note 53.
294
Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B. 112, 113. In this ruling, the Service stated:
The above legislative history indicates that in limiting rental charges, Congress
assumed deductions oftax losses would be allowed to encourage investment in projects
providing decent housing for low or moderate income families under the Act.
Consequently, application of section 183 of the Code to the present case would frustrate
congressional intent in enacting the housing legislation. Therefore, section 183 will not
be applied to disallow losses incurred in activities to provide low and moderate income
housing under section 236 of the National Housing Act.
Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B. 112, 113.
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when enacting the enabling legislation for the NHA section 236
program that: (a) section 236 project partnerships likely would not
realize any economic profit due to limitations on the amounts
chargeable as rent and distributable in cash to partners and (b) a
partner's investment return in such partnerships would compare
adequately with returns on other investments only if tax losses
could be taken into account. 285 The General Counsel Memorandum
accompanying the ruling explained that "[c]onsequently, the
Commissioner has made a policy decision that Section 183 will not
be applied to disallow losses incurred by partners engaged in the
construction and operation of low and moderate income housing
under Section 236 of the National Housing Act." 286 This
explanation sounds more like "administrative convenience,"287 but
the ruling clearly adopted a public policy rationale that the Service
later extended to other low and moderate income housing
partnerships where the expectations of economic profits were
doubtful. 288
285

Id.

286

G.C.M. 38,117 (Sept. 28, 1979). In the litigation context of Blitzer v. United States, 684
F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982), the offices of the Commissioner and the Chief Counsel as well as the
representatives of Treasury decided that the Service would not rely on an "economic reality"
to disallow losses from such activities. G.C.M. 38,117 (Sept. 28, 1979). The Department of
Justice agreed. Id.
The section 236 program is designed to provide decent housing for many low and
moderate income families who otherwise could not afford it. As the above legislative
history indicates, the program relies on certain tax benefits to encourage private
investors to construct and manage low and moderate income housing projects. ·If section
183 were applied to deny these tax benefits to the section 236 projects, few, if any, would
invest in these projects. As a result, the goal of building more low and moderate income
housing would not be fulfilled.
When Congress enacted section 183, it recognized that this section was a broad provision
that might technically encompass certain situations to which it was not intended to
apply. The Committee on Finance expressed its desire that section 183 be reasonably
administered and stated that the Service should limit the disallowance of the deduction
of losses under this provision to cases in which "it is generally recognized that this is
appropriate." S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 103-104 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423,
490.
G.C.M. 38,117 (Sept. 28, 1979).
287
See supra notes 81-96 and accompanying text.
288
See, e.g., P.L.R. 85-31-065 (May 9, 1985). The letter ruling sets forth the Service's
conclusion that:
[T]he fact that individual dwelling units may be sold under options to low-income
tenants at a price which limits the Partnership's profit will not cause the Project to be
treated as "an activity not engaged in for profit" under section 183(a) of the Code, and
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B. Application of the Public Policy Doctrine to Cyclical
Aircraft Maintenance Costs
In order for the FAA safety policy to be considered in the tax
treatment of cyclical aircraft maintenance costs, the model analysis
set forth earlier in this article requires that two tests be met. First,
Congress or the courts must have clearly identified an overlap of
the FAA safety policy with the tax policy applicable to the
treatment ofthese costs. Next, the application ofthe Service's tax
policy, with respect to the capitalization of these maintenance costs,
must severely frustrate the FAA's safety policy underlying the
required cyclical overhauls of aircraft engines. As the subsequent
discussion indicates, the airline industry's case is much stronger as
to the former requirement than the latter.
1. Clear Identification of Overlap of IRS and FAA Policies as to

Maintenance Costs
History suggests that expressions not subject to a formal vote of
Congress or Committee are not sufficient to trigger the public policy
Based on this, Chairman Archer's letter to
doctrine. 289
the Service will not use the "not for profit" argument to deny related deductions under
sections 162, 165, 167 and 212.
!d.
289
For instance, the Service apparently ignored an October 7, 1987 letter to House Ways
and Means Chairman Rostenkowski, D-Ill., signed by all of the other members of the
Committee. See Letter from Thomas Downey et al., Representative, U.S. House of
Representatives, to Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee (Oct.
7, 1987), reprinted in Ways and Means Members as for Technical Correction to Relieve FreeLance Writers from the New Uniform Capitalization Rules, 87 Tax Notes Today 197-10 (Oct.
9, 1987) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit. 87 TNT 197-10). The letter requested the
Chairman's "assistance in reconsidering the application of the uniform capitalization rules
of section 263A, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, to the expenses of professional
free-lance creators, such as writers and photographers." !d. The letter described the
administrative issues arising from the application of income forecasting in depreciation to
writer prepublication expenses:
As noted in our report accompanying H.R. 3838, it was not intended that the uniform
capitalization rules would apply "where application of the rules might be unduly
burdensome". (H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, p. 625). In fact very substantial administrative
and accounting burdens, including allocation and income forecasting requirements that
are unlikely to be manageable by either taxpayers or the Internal Revenue Service
would be imposed on professional creators such as writers and photographers by the
uniform capitalization requirements. In the case of free-lance writers, for instance, each
of a writer's legitimate professional expenses must be "allocated" among all pending
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Commissioner Richardson 290 and the bipartisan Ways and Means
Committee Members' letter to Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, 291
both ofwhich criticized the Service's failure to consider FAA safety
policy in its treatment of aircraft maintenance costs, would not
satisfy the suggested prerequisite of clear congressional
identification of the overlapping policies.
The discussion in the 1996 Conference Committee Report,
however, probably would meet the clear identification requirement
of the analysis. 292 The major question with respect to the
committee discussion is whether congressional recognition of the
overlap of tax and non-tax policy was established too late. Under
classic rules of statutory construction, the views of a later Congress
cannot affect the meaning of a term enacted by an earlier Congress
unless the act of the earlier Congress is being statutorily amended

works and then recovered based on the projected profitability of the novel, article or
poem. The task of allocating the expense of each telephone call and expenditure for
supplies among each pending project is nearly impossible. In addition, the requirement
of estimating the likely profitability of a project that has only begun is equally difficult.
In each case little more than guesswork is involved. . . . In sum, we think there is little
question that any theoretical benefit of applying capitalization requirements to the
expense of professional free·lance creators such as authors or photographers is
far-outweighed by the countervailing considerations of the significant burden imposed
on these taxpayers, the introduction of material uncertainty in the computation of tax
liability by these individuals, and the unfairness of singling out this group of individuals
who earn income from their personal efforts.
!d. Action by the Service came only after Congress began to act in 1988. See infra notes 29293 and accompanying text.
290
See Archer Letter, supra note 9.
291
See Letter from Mac Collins et al., supra note 13. The Committee members urged
reversal of the T.A.M. stating:
This Congress and the Administration, through the Federal Aviation Administration,
is working hard to enhance the safety of the traveling public. The United States
airline industry has the best safety record in the world. We do not believe the
Administration intends to increase the cost of ensuring the public safety by making it
more expensive to perform routine maintenance and repair of aircraft. Clearly the
IRS is overstepping its authority in attempting to impose this tax penalty on air
safety.
We are troubled by the IRS's change of policy without the benefit of legislation or
rulemaking. If the IRS intends to implement a change in policy of this magnitude,
we believe the change should be the subject of hearings before the Committees of
appropriate jurisdiction in the Congress.
Letter from Mac Collins et al., supra note 13.
292
See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-863, at 1149 (1996), 142 Cong. Rec. Hll644, H12009 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1996). See supra notes 24 and 28.
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by the later Congress. 293 This rule of statutory construction should
probably not apply here because the issue is not the intended
meaning of a tax term, but rather identification of an overlap of tax
and non-tax policies. The Service's actions in 1988 as to writers'
prepublication costs indicate that this form of congressional
identification of non-tax and tax policy overlap may be sufficient. 294
Notice 88-62 authorized writers to elect to capitalize
prepublication costs and then depreciate 50% ofthese costs in the
tax year in which they were paid and 25% in each tax year
thereafter. 295 The Notice was based. on a standard expressed in the
1986legislative history to section 263A that sought to reduce the
administrative complexities of complying with the Uniform
Capitalization Rules. 296 The Service reasoned that the three-year
depreciation safe harbor substantially reduced the administrative
difficulties associated with compliance by eliminating the necessity
to amortize the capitalized costs under the income forecast
method. 297 The Service's application of this standard in Notice 8862 is germane to the Service's treatment of cyclical aircraft
maintenance costs in two ways. First, the Service's recognition of
the policy enunciated in the 1986 legislative history shows its
reliance on congressional identification of the overlap of policies.
Second, it is also indirect support for the exercise of a broad
mandate in allowing a current deduction, under section 446(b)'s
clear reflection of income standard, at a point sooner than such
deduction would otherwise be allowed-essentially the standard this
article advocates for capitalization under section 263.

293
294
295
296
297

I d.

See Rough Justice, supra note 16.
See Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548.
Id.
SeeS. Rep. No. 99-313, at 142 (1986).
Notice 88-62, 1988-1 C.B. 548. The Service noted:
The legislative history of section 263A indicates that Congress was aware of the possible
administrative complexities resulting from the application of the uniform capitalization
rules to businesses. In response to this concern, Congress granted the Treasury
Department authority under section 263A to "adopt other simplifying methods and
assumptions where, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury, the costs and
other burdens of literal compliance may outweigh the benefits." S. Rep. 99-313, 99th
Cong. 2d Sess. 141-42 (1986).
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2. Severe Frustration of the FAA Safety Policy
The argument that the current tax policy with respect to the
treatment of cyclical aircraft maintenance costs would severely
frustrate the FAA's airline safety policy is weaker than the
argument supporting the congressional identification of policy
overlaps.
Allowing a current deduction for these cyclical
maintenance costs will not free up revenues to spend on airline
safety as Chairman Archer has implied because the airline industry
is currently deducting these costs anyway. 298 The airlines
economically must perform the required FAA safety inspections and
overhauls regardless of the tax consequences. Therefore, revoking
the Service's capitalization rule as set forth in the T.A.M. still
would not allow the airlines to reduce safety costs below FAA
standards, nor would it increase revenues likely allocable to
increased airline safety since the airlines are unlikely to take safety
measures above those required by the FAA.
The argument that allowing a current deduction for cyclical
maintenance costs would be a revenue loser for the federal
government is also an anomaly. Assume (as the Ways and Means
Committee does) that all airline industry taxpayers have been
expensing the cost of FAA-mandated aircraft engine overhauls in
the year these costs were incurred. Thus the costs relating to the
overhaul of any one engine are incurred and deducted once every
four years. Under the pay-go rules, 299 the ideal rule of capitalizing
and depreciating the overhaul costs would be included in the base
line so that a statute allowing a current deduction would be
counted as a revenue loser. Assuming that the correct depreciation
period is four years and that one quarter of the engines are
overhauled each year, the deduction in the fourth year would be the
same under both approaches. Thus, in three to four years the
current airlines would have the same amount of deductions for
depreciation as they would if they had currently expensed the costs
ofthe overhauls. Such a result seems to only bolster the idea that
the Service's approach is indeed more-trouble-than-it's-worth, even
without considering the possible frustration of non-tax policy.
298
299

See supra text accompanying note 12; supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
See supra note 25.
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Despite the weakened severe-frustration prong of the public
policy doctrine analysis in this case, reading the public policy
doctrine together with a handful of rulings, in which the Service did
not apply a general tax rule because it would frustrate a non-tax
congressional policy,300 could support the Service's adoption of a
position that would take FAA safety policies into account and
reverse the T.A.M. Further consideration of non-tax public policy
in light of rough justice current deduction rules would tend to allow
·factors, such as the fact that the interval of recurrence is only one
year longer than a three-year cycle which often has been found to
support current deduction 301 and the fact that the amount of the
costs involved is relatively de minimis, 302 to tip the scales in favor
of a current deduction. Whether the Service's tax policy severely
frustrates FAA airline safety policy is an area that requires more
attention; however, any consideration of non-tax policy in this area
should be explicit.
Based upon comments at the VTSG Spring 1997 Symposium, it
is unlikely that any frustration of public policy argument here
would carry the day in litigation in the Tax Court. Nor is it likely
to be very appealing to Chief Counsel.

C. Negotiated Rulemaking: Evolution from Notice 96-7
Negotiated rulemaking constitutes an open process in which
representatives ofthe administrative agency and various pressure
groups work together to find a compromise solution to the problem
facing the administrative agency. 303 Congress has on occasion

See supra discussion, part IV.A.
See supra discussion, part II.B.2.
302
See supra discussion, part II.B.l.
303
See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 Geo. L.J. 1 (1982);
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Administrative Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Development of
Negotiated Rulemaking and Other D14 Pepp. L. Rev. 863 (1987); Lawrence Susskind &
Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 133
(1985); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory
Negotiation, 43 Duke L.J. 1206 (1994); Daniel J. Fiorino, Dimensions of Negotiated
Rulemaking: Practical Constraints and Theoretical Implications, in Conflict Resolution and
Public Policy 141 (Miriam K. Mills ed., 1990); Administrative Conference of the United
States, Negotiated Rulemaking Source Book 1 (1990).
300

301
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mandated such endeavors. 304 In the tax arena negotiated
rulemaking has been much more informal. Probably the most
significant. examples of informal negotiated regulation or its
functional equivalent are the "collegial" tax reforms of the late
1970's and early 1980's. Staff from Treasury and the tax writing
committees at times met with representatives from the tax
professional groups (e.g., ABA and AICPA) to agree upon tax
reform rules to be presented to the committees against a backdrop
of public hearings in which the more traditional, or at least overt,
pressure groups could voice their view on the reforms. 305
·
In mid-1979 the Chairs of the House Ways and Means and
Senate Finance Committees introduced a bill to clarify and simplify
section 453, intended as the first of a number of discrete
simplification bills to be introduced over the next several years. 306
Treasury's Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel, Hank Gutman, saw
this bill as an "important barometer of the fortunes of the
simplification effort."307 The 1979 installment reporting bill, largely
drafted by Treasury, 308 ran into much opposition from pressure
groups in the 1979 Hearings. 309 House Ways and Means Chairman

304

The Environmental Protection Agency was one of the first agencies to institutionalize
this process and provide problem selection criteria. 48 Fed. Reg. 7494 (1983); see also 5
U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (Supp. V 1994).
305
See Howard J. Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 Tax L.
Rev. 411 (1982) (Examples: Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-4 71, 94
stat. 2247 (1980); Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980);
Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97·354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982); and Limitation
on Net Operating Loss Carry Forwards enacted in Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99514, § 621, 100 Stat. 2085, 2254 (1986), where no consensus was reached, but the tax writing
committees struck their own balance). The more recent section 197, Treatment of
Intangibles, enacted in Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, §
13261, 107 Stat. 312, 532 (1993), had more extensive public hearings and more hard data on
actual practice than prior reform efforts, but again apparently less negotiated-regulation,
with the tax writing committees simply dictating the result.
306
H.R. 3899, 96th Cong. (1979); see Hoffman, supra note 305, at 495-96.
307
Installment Sales, Subtitle F Simplification, and Miscellaneous Tax Measures: Hearings
on H.R. 2536, H.R. 2770, H.R. 3660, H.R. 3899, H.R. 3900, H.R. 42001, and H.R. 4726 Before
the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Ways and Means Comm., 96th Cong.
33 (1979) (prepared statement of Deputy Tax Legislative Counsel Harry L. Gutman)
[hereinafter 1979 House Hearings].
308
Hoffman, supra note 305, at 507.
308
Tax Simplifications: Hearings on S. 1062 and S. 1063 before the Subcomm. on Taxation
and Debt Management Generally of the Sen. Finance Comm., 96th Cong. 50 (1979) (statement
of Senator Harry Byrd, D-Va.); 1979 House Hearings, supra note 307, at 81 (statement of
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Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., then directed Treasury to work with
representatives from the Bar Associations and the AICPA to come
up with a mutually acceptable reform provision. They did, in a
consensual process310 ably spearheaded by Professor Martin
Ginsburg. 3 u
More recently, the development of market segment
understandings 312 and some Industry Specialization Program
("ISP") coordinated issue papers constitute further examples of
informal negotiated regulation. 313 Lee understands, from an
Eastern Virginia CPNattorney involved on a national level with
tax administration in a professional society, that at least one
Market Segment Specialization Program ("MSSP") guide was also
developed in this manner.

Professor Martin Ginsburg) ("only truly controversial provision" is the barring of installment
reporting to sales to a related party); 1979 House Hearings, supra note 307, at 71, 74-75, 7879 (statement and prepared statement of Herbert J. Lemer, Chairman Tax Accounting
Subcommittee, Federal Tax Division, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants).
Professor Ginsburg had advocated that ratable basis recovery and not cost recovery should
obtain wherever the total purchase price is fixed. Martin D. Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for
Future Payment, 30 Tax L. Rev. 469, 493-94 (1975).
310
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Description of H.R. 6883
Relating to Revision of Installment Sale Reporting Rules 1 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter
1980 Staff Description)); Miscellaneous Tax Bills IX· Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Fin. Comm., 96th Cong. 97 (1980)
(Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Legislation) Daniel Halperin) ("The
objective was to produce a revised bill incorporating the proposals made and resolving
adequately the issues raised in the testimony and comments received by the Subcommittee.
Treasury, along with those groups whose representatives were willing to donate the requisite
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the two New York tax groups and was vice chairman of the Special Committee on
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We do not view, as some academics do, garden~variety hearings
on proposed regulations and ensuing modifications in response to
pressure group complaints as rising to the level of negotiated
rulemaking or "neg-reg," but do agree with Professor Carole C.
Berry314 that Treasury regulations would often benefit from this
process. Indeed, we see Treasury regulation of capitalization tax
issues as crying out for this approach. 315 We believe that the ideal
solution for cyclical airplane engine overhauls is the promulgation
of legislative regulations pursuant to a statutory authorization,
enumerating factors that in rough form had been the subject of
public hearings and then were refined by a negotiating group of
Treasury and IRS officials (and former officials concemed with
capitalization issues), FAA and Department of Transportation
folks, the accounting and legal professions, pressure groups, and
academic representatives directed by the Chairman/Commissioner
to come up with a solution. This article offers such negotiated
rulemaking as a defusing technique that would address all of the
problems raised herein, including above all, the political one. Were
Technical Advice Memorandum 96-18-004 simply reversed with a
tersely worded published ruling, as was the case with the soil
remediation T.A.M., every other industry faced with a new postINDOPCO ruling or ISP, MSU or significant issue will seek to
challenge it politically. 316 Conversely if the Service does not
consider FAA policy and/or hold a public hearing or equivalent,
considering at least in part the tax treatment of cyclical safety
aircraft engine overhauls, Congress in the near future might
suspend, through limitation riders or the like, application of the
reasoning of Technical Advice Memorandum 96-18-004 until the
Service acts. Either way the Service may well find its whole postINDOPCO strategy much more trouble than it ever could have been
worth. We recommend that the apparent IRS strategy be shifted
from establishing rules through audit, litigation and occasional

Carole C. Berry, Sub S One Class of Stock Requirement: Rulemaking Gone Wrong, 44
Cath. U. L. Rev. 11, 20-24, 54-58 (1994).
315
We are very grateful to Ms. Berry's work for acquainting us with this useful concept. ·
Professor Lee's colleague Charles Koch, a recognized administrative law expert, helped as
well.
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Cf Art Pine, Congress Stirs Up IRS Enforcement, Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1978, at El. That
is just what happened the first time.
314

242

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 17:161

· rulings to utilizing the medium of "structured discretionary justice"
regulations. Such regulations, ideally modeled after the revised
section 355 corporate separations regulations or perhaps the
partnership anti-abuse regulations, should cover capitalization and
depreciation in general. Ideally these structured discretionary
justice regulations, containing detailed balancing tests, should
themselves be formulated through negotiated rulemaking in which
FAA representatives, etc., are invited to participate on appropriate
topics. A marriage of the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980
and the "collegial tax reform" experiences of the amortization of
purchased intangibles provision offers a handy analogue for
negotiated rulemaking for capitalization/depredation versus
expensing regulations. Major steps towards simplification and
towards the Service being less intrusive in business decisions could
result from implementation of all (or perhaps even any) of these
proposals.
V. CONCLUSIONS: A STREAM CAN RISE NO HIGHER THAN
ITS SOURCE

IRS-bashing by Congress here seems hypocritical. In the area of
capitalization versus expensing, the tax writing committees
repeatedly have chosen to leave the question of deductibility,
particularly as to self-created intangibles like long-term recurring
repairs, to the case law. Time after time in the aftermath of such
deliberate congressional inaction, however, the mercies of the case
law proved to be not as tender as the pressure groups had
anticipated. 317 Moreover in light of this inaction, transaction costs
have mounted as capitalization doctrines have ebbed and flowed
between the Supreme Court's puzzling pronouncements in
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n 318 and INDOPCO,
Inc. v. Commissioner. 319

317
See, e.g., supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text (discussing the fate of the soil
remediation T.A.M.).
318
403 U.S. 345 (generating the supposedly determinative separate and distinct asset
analysis).
319
503 U.S. 79 (resurrecting the future benefit analysis).
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Yet the Service does not come forward with clean hands either.
Officials from Treasury and the Service have repeatedly claimed
that INDOPCO did not change the law as to capitalization.
Nevertheless, the Field is currently interpreting the future benefit
presumption of capitalization much more broadly than in the past320
and in litigation the Service has argued that INDOPCO created a
!'new look."321 An examination of rulings over the past two decades
shows that the Chief Counsel's Office in fact followed the judicial
trend of the moment as the separate asset doctrine rose and then
fell, but it never stopped auditing and litigating for a future benefit
capitalization rule. In the meantime, Chief Counsel's Office,
recognizing the hazards oflitigation and administrative concerns,
from time to time recommended rough justice current deduction
rules that the Commissioner almost never followed. Thus, Chief
Counsel Stuart Brown's claim that the cyclical aircraft engine
overhaul T.A.M. does not reflect a change in the Service's position
is ingenuous.
The advancement of general capitalization ·regulations is
overdue. For almost twenty years, the Field has been desperate for
guidance by the National Office as to the standards-actually it
prefers rules-for capitalization. Despite protestations of denial, the
Chief Counsel's Office position as to the capitalization rules did
change as the tide of cases shifted from the taxpayer "separate
asset doctrine" victories to the government victories under other
tests culminating finally in INDOPCO. Regulations should be
introduced that follow the discretionary justice approach outlined
earlier, including the various safe harbor deductions that avoid
income distortion. Furthermore, an open dialogue must take place
to determine whether and, if so, under what conditions other
agency policies should be taken into account in fashioning tax rules.
Ideally, this dialogue would culminate in the suggested negotiated
rulemaking strategy. Given the numerous inconsistenCies and
frustration of public policy, a limitation rider mandating such a
process and regulations might not be such a bad thing.
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See Rough Justice, supra note 16.
See Sun Microsystems, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1002.

